

Falklands Ex.

CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES:
MONDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 1979: 4.30 PM

1. Sr Blanco said he had been instructed to deliver a letter (attached) from Commodore Bloomer Reeve, Chef de Cabinet to the Argentine Foreign Minister. This was in reply to Mr Ridley's message of 6 August (attached) which had been delivered in Buenos Aires by Mr Carless commenting, in turn, on the Argentine aide-memoire (also attached) given to Mr Ridley shortly before his departure from Buenos Aires.

2. Having read the letter, Mr Ridley said he would be grateful if Sr Blanco could make it clear in reply that his previous message did not imply any criticism. He shared Comodoro Cavandoli's view that the purpose of his visit last July had been to meet the Government and to exchange views. Both sides had agreed to confirm their decision to exchange Ambassadors. Mr Ridley never thought it would be possible to hold substantive discussions on the Falklands. We could not go very far in advance of Cabinet clearance for the negotiations to continue. It was now agreed that our respective Foreign Secretaries would meet in New York. If that meeting went well, he would be available thereafter for substantive negotiations. The two sides would need to agree on a convenient venue and dates. It was not our purpose to slow things down. After the New York meeting, both sides would need to examine their positions and prepare for the negotiating round. Early November might be an appropriate time to meet. The meeting could not take place in Buenos Aires or London since it was important to hold it away from external pressures. Perhaps New York/Washington would

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-2-

be suitable. But Mr Ridley said he would be happy for Commodore Cavandoli to put forward proposals.

3. Sr Blanco asked whether we had suggestions as to agenda. Mr Ridley said that the talks would be concerned with the future of the Islands and related questions. The main requirement was to settle the dispute. But we could also discuss Anglo/Argentine cooperation more broadly including Antarctic matters. A solution would require concessions from both sides. While we expected to move forward on the basis of the terms of reference agreed in 1977, the present administration's position was relatively uncluttered. The negotiations would be entered into without precondition. But Mr Ridley emphasised that the Government stood by its predecessor's undertaking about respecting the wishes of the Islanders. It was also important that the negotiations should take place in total secrecy.

4. Sr Blanco said he would like to take the opportunity to refer to the issue of "disappeared persons". Many believed that those who had disappeared had been killed by the Government. He reminded Mr Ridley that Argentina had gone through a civil war. Undoubtedly many people had been killed in battle. Others had fled the country; rival gangs had operated. The Government had decided to introduce the "Law on Disappeared Persons" to help stabilize things. The objective had been to help the relatives of the disappeared. They would now be able to claim inheritances; obtain social benefits. Some criticism had been levelled by people who said that the law made it easier for the Government to legalise the disappearances. This was not the case. Only if there were special reasons why relatives could not initiate proceedings under the new law would the State do so. And it would finally be up to the courts to decide whether a declaration of

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-3-

presumed death should be issued. The courts operated independently. Sr Blanco also referred to the current visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. His Government was doing its best to bring the situation back to normal. These moves had to be seen in the knowledge that the Argentines had suffered a civil war. Mr Ridley thanked Sr Blanco for this explanation. For the sake of the Argentine Government's respectability, he hoped they would continue measures to improve the situation. Argentina's international relations had suffered on account of human rights.

5. Sr Blanco said things had got quite out of control during the Government of Sra de Peron. Subsequently a strong reaction had come from the Right. It had been difficult to control. Even now certain activities had not been erased altogether. But overall the situation was much better. No organised acts of terrorism were now committed. Mr Ridley said we had seen the visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as positive. He hoped the Government would now be able to run the country smoothly. If the human rights situation improved, our relations could become more cordial.

South America Department
20 September 1979

Distribution

Files

PS/Mr Ridley

SANB

Mr Harding

Chancery, Buenos Aires

Fort Stanley

*República de la
Argentina*

Buenos Aires, 12th September, 1979

Dear Mr. Ridley,

Mr. Carless has delivered to me your message dated 6th August containing some comments on the Aide-Memoire I had given you a few minutes before your departure from Buenos Aires.

The subjects put forward in that document are undoubtedly important and, as you duly point out, need a careful consideration. It is not my intention to dwell on these matters now, as we could well examine them together during our next meeting. I would not wish though that any misunderstanding could interfere with our recent but sincere and cordial friendship and I would therefore like to clarify the reasons for giving you the aforementioned Aide-Memoire at the last minute, what - I am told - caused you some disappointment.

Prior to your arrival in Argentina, the British Embassy had informed us that your mission was of a merely informative character and that consequently, it was not your intention to hold substantive discussions about the question of the Islas Malvinas.

It goes without saying, that I was ready and willing to continue the negotiations on that occasion, but, respecting your motivations, I had no objections in accepting that our talks on that matter were restricted - as in fact was the case - to exchanging ideas on the modalities and possible dates of the future rounds of negotiations. Indeed, it was in the same spirit of not

Mr. Nicholas Ridley, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
London

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contradicting your wishes, that I delayed the delivery of the Memorandum for as long as I could. I thought that in doing so, you were going to avoid having to make any early comments, thus allowing you to meditate on the subjects mentioned therein, during your return flight, and analyzing them with your staff in London, in order to discuss them in due course. After all, your mission would not have been totally informative if our points of view over certain pending aspects had not been conveyed to you.

I sincerely regret that my good intentions were misunderstood, but I suppose this is liable to happen between two people who are not yet well aware of each others' way of acting.

It was a great pleasure having you here with us and I look forward to having the opportunity of intensively continuing our dialogue, which I trust will be very beneficial to the Anglo-Argentine relations.

I suppose our next meeting will take place on a date to be agreed by us, after the meeting in New York between both Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly. I would like to know your opinion in this regard.

Please, accept my cordial regards and the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

(Signed)
Carlos F. Bloomer Levee
Commodore
Chief of Cabinet of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship

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FROM BRASILIA 30:1970Z JUL 70

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 30 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES AND PRIORITY PORT STANLEY

FROM PS/ MR RIDLEY

BUENOS AIRES TELEGRAM NUMBER 198: ARGENTINE AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE FALKLANDS.

1. MR RIDLEY WISHES TO REACT TO THE DELIVERY OF THE ARGENTINE AIDE MEMOIRE BROADLEY ON THE LINES MR CARLESS HAS SUGGESTED. SUBJECT TO YOUR ADVICE, HE WOULD LIKE CARLESS TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CAVANDOLI, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

QUOTE

I HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE TO READ A TRANSLATION OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH MR BLOOMER REEVE HANDED TO MY PRIVATE SECRETARY ON OUR DEPARTURE FROM BUENOS AIRES. I MUST SAY I WAS A LITTLE DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GIVE IT TO ME EARLIER SO THAT I COULD STUDY IT, OR TO WARN ME THAT IT WAS COMING. AT LEAST I NOW HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS. OF COURSE THEY RAISE IMPORTANT ISSUES, AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OR I MAY WISH TO SEND YOU A FULLER REPLY AFTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION. I WOULD HOWEVER STRESS ONE POINT AT THIS STAGE. I AM MOST ENCOURAGED TO READ THAT YOU ALSO CONSIDER THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I WAS IN THE ISLANDS, I MADE IT CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER NO SETTLEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE WHICH DID NOT REEPLY TO THE ISSUES OF THE ISLANDERS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT FOR US THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND IT WILL NOT CHANGE. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON SOME POINTS OF THE DISPUTE.

/S/ MR RIDLEY

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IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AGAIN. I AM SORRY THAT OUR ARRIVAL WAS DELAYED, AND I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU MADE TO REVISE MY PROGRAMME IN BUENOS AIRES. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU, BELIEVING THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF US ALL TO REACH A SETTLEMENT TO THIS PROBLEM WHICH, AS YOU SAY, IS AN IMPEDIMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY. UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

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PS/LPS

PS/HR RIDLEY

PS/FUS

GEN A PARSONS

GEN A DUFF

MR LIND

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BUEENOS AIRES 021645Z JUL 79
- IMMEDIATE FOR
TELEGRAM NUMBER 100^A OF 28 JULY
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA (FOR PS/MR RIDLEY)
INFO FORT STANLEY

SUBJECT : VISIT OF MY RIDLEY AND FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE.

BEGINS

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR SATISFACTION AT SEEING THE INTENTION, SHARED BY BOTH PARTIES, TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AGREED BY THE TWO PARTIES IN APRIL 1977.

IN AGREEMENT WITH WHAT MINISTER RIDLEY HAS SAID, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AT A MORE DYNAMIC PACE, WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND WITH THE SENSE OF URGENCY WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS HAS DECIDED MUST BE GIVEN TO A SOLUTION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE OVER THE ISLANDS.

IN THIS RESPECT WE WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO SEE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE, LORD CARRINGTON, IN HIS MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER, EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE IN BEING ABLE TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND WITH THE SINCERE INTENTION OF RESOLVING THE DIFFERENCES UNQUOTE. TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF WHAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND THE MESSAGE TO BE REFERRING, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE BRITISH SIDE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER SOME ASPECTS OF THE POSITION THEY ADOPTED AT THE NEW YORK MEETING LAST MARCH. THIS POSITION, FAR FROM OFFERING POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY BRINGING VIEWS CLOSER TOGETHER AND SEARCHING FOR POINTS OF AGREEMENT, CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS A REGRETTABLE STEP BACKWARDS.

A MODIFICATION OF THE STAND ADOPTED BY THE UK IN MARCH OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD FIT THE LINE OF THINKING EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER MR CALLAGHAN IN HIS MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ALFONSO IN MARCH 1976, AND THE PAPER HANDED TO SUBSECRETARY ALLARA

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/ BY MR HENONDS

AGREEMENT (OIC) IN ROME IN JULY 1977 AND FORMALISED ONLY AFTER THE NEW YORK MEETING OF DECEMBER THAT YEAR. THE FREQUENT EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN SUBSECRETARY CAVANOLLI AND MR RIDLEY IN BUENOS AIRES SUGGESTS THAT THE LATTER IS GUIDED BY A SIMILAR CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

ANOTHER SOURCE OF CONCERN IS THE FATE OF THE AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION, THE RESULT OF A BRITISH INITIATIVE AND THE OUTLINES OF WHICH WERE AGREED IN THE MEETING LAST DECEMBER. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOPE THAT THIS AGREEMENT CAN STILL BE CARRIED FORWARD IN THE TERMS AGREED IN GENEVA.

THE REASON GIVEN BY THE BRITISH SIDE FOR SUSPENDING THE AGREEMENT, BASED ON THE WILL OF THE ISLANDERS, IS A FURTHER SOURCE OF CONCERN FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED KINGDOM KNOWS OUR POSITION WELL. WE MAINTAIN THAT THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS ARE NOT PART OF THE DISPUTE AND THUS ALTHOUGH THEIR INTERESTS MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT, THEY MUST NOT BECOME A THIRD PARTY IN NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED TO SOLVE THE DISPUTE.

ASIDE FROM THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE, THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INSISTENCE ON MAKING ANY RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS CONDITIONAL UPON THE WILL OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE NEGATIVE, AND WILL SURROUND WITH UNCERTAINTIES THE AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD BE REACH BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT ABOVE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH SIDE SHOULD RECONSIDER THESE ASPECTS OF THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS EVIDENCE THAT THEY REALLY ASPIRE TO BROAD CO-OPERATION WITH ARGENTINA ON THE BASIS OF A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO A DISPUTE WHICH DISTURBS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ALL FIELDS.

CARLESS

F I L E S:

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| S AM D | PS |
| N AM D | PS/LFS |
| UND | PS/MR RIDLEY |
| FUSD | PS/PUS |
| IFD | SIR A. FARSONS |
| CFD | SIR A. DUFF |
| DFP | MR HALL |
| ESD | MISS BROWN |