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for PS  
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 22 MAY

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA AND WASHINGTON

SAVING TO ABU DHABI, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, KHARTOUM,  
KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT

YOUR TELNO 130: ANGLO/SAUDI RELATIONS

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TUR WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT AND ALSO ENQUIRED WHETHER HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PUT IN A GOOD WORD FOR US WITH THE SAUDIS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT THERE (AS I HAD ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE HE AND THE KING WENT TO SAUDI ARABIA: MY TELEGRAM NO 156 OF 29 APRIL).
2. THE KING TOLD ME HE HAD BEEN FULLY EXPECTING THE SAUDIS TO BRING UP "DEATH OF A PRINCESS" WITH HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND HE HAD THEREFORE "WASTED THE EVENING" PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE SEEING THE FILM ON VIDEO. HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT THE SAUDI LEADERS HAD NOT SAID VERY MUCH TO HIM ON THE SUBJECT, APART FROM SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS SOME SORT OF CONSPIRACY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES TO DEFAME THE SAUDI REGIME. HE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD PLEADED OUR CAUSE, AND I WOULD GUESS FROM THIS THAT HE MAY HAVE JUDGED IT WAS NOT OPPORTUNE TO DO SO.
3. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SAUDIS HAD PLAYED THEIR HAND COMPLETELY WRONGLY OVER THE FILM, WHICH WAS OF LITTLE INTRINSIC WORTH. IF ONLY THEY HAD KEPT QUIET, SCANT ATTENTION WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID TO IT. BY OBJECTING SO STRONGLY AND PUBLICLY, THEY HAD ENSURED THAT THE FILM RECEIVED MUCH WIDER PUBLICITY THAN IT MERITED.
4. THE KING SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED WE WOULD SUCCEED IN CLEARING UP OUR MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SAUDIS AND WISHED US LUCK WITH ANY MEASURES WE MIGHT TAKE TO THIS END. HE SAID HE WAS RATHER INTRIGUED TO KNOW WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO, AS HE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR YEARS TO GET THE SAUDIS TO DO WHAT HE WANTED BUT HAD VERY RARELY SUCCEEDED EXCLAM.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM  
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ADVANCED

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ANGLO-SAUDI SPECIAL

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