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FM FCO 131600Z AUGUST 81
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1210 OF 13 AUGUST 1981.
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, CAPE TOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA.
TELCON FULLER/CRABBIE:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECOND MESSAGE FROM
MR HAIG TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, RECEIVED TODAY:

'DEAR PETER, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW HOW CONCERNED I AM ABOUT THE
DRIFT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA SINCE THE
OTTAWA SUMMIT. I CAME AWAY FROM OTTAWA CONVINCED THAT WE WERE OF
A COMMON MIND THAT THERE ARE SEPARATE BUT MUTUALLY REINFORCING
TRACKS ON NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. IT WAS, AT OTTAWA, AND REMAINS
TODAY OUR VIEW THAT:

(A) OUR NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS, AS A CONTACT GROUP, WITH THE SOUTH
AFRICANS AND ULTIMATELY WITH THE FRONT LINE AND SWAPO MUST, THE
USG RECOGNIZES, PROCEED WITHOUT ANY FORMAL LINKAGE TO CUBAN
WITHDRAWAL. IN SUM, CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA CANNOT BE
ESTABLISHED AS A 'PRECONDITION' TO A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

(B) NONETHELESS, THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SETTLEMENT IN
NAMIBIA AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, AS THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES HAVE
SAID.

(C) INDEED, GIVEN SOUTH AFRICAN NEEDS FOR A STABLE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT, AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO A SETTLEMENT
WITHOUT ASSURANCE THAT THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WILL END,
A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL MUST BE A COROLLARY TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT
IN NAMIBIA.

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD REACHED COMMON AGREEMENT AT OTTAWA
ON A FORMULA SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED ABOVE, I
BELIEVED WE COULD RELATIVELY EASILY AGREE TO A PROCEDURE THAT

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WOULD INCLUDE:

(I) A LETTER FROM THE CONTACT GROUP TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS CONCERNING THE INTEGRITY OF 435 AND A TIME FRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION. THE DRAFTS WE SENT YOU ON THIS AND YOUR INITIAL REACTION INDICATE THAT WE COULD QUICKLY AGREE ON A FINAL TEXT:

(II) AN EXPERTS LEVEL MEETING IN LATE AUGUST TO BEGIN DRAFTING A SET OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, THUS MOVING TOWARD THE CULMINATION OF PHASE ONE OF THE NAMIBIA PROCESS:

(III) FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA DESIGNED TO ASSURE THAT THEY REMAIN ON THE AGREED TRACK: AND

(IV) US WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A FIRST SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT WITH THE ANGOLANS AND WITH THIRD PARTIES INCLUDING THE FRONT LINE AIMED AT OPENING A DIALOGUE ON THE CUBAN ISSUE, AND THUS ACTIVATING THE SECOND TRACK.

I WAS, THEREFORE, DISTURBED TO LEARN FROM EAGLEBURGER THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING IN PARIS REVEALED THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE COMMON AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE WITHOUT WHICH THE USG CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE PROCEED FURTHER, I.E., THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIA QUESTION. THUS, SO FAR AS I AM ABLE TO DISCERN, THE CONTACT GROUP REMAINS DEEPLY DIVIDED ON AN ISSUE OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA, ANGOLA, AND THE FRONT LINE STATES. FRANKLY, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THIS ISSUE BE SETTLED: WE MUST EITHER REACH AGREEMENT AMONG OURSELVES ON THE CRITICAL QUESTION BEFORE US OR DECIDE IF THERE IS, IN FACT, ANY MERIT IN CONTINUING OUR WORK AS A CONTACT GROUP. WITHOUT SOLID AGREEMENT FIRST ON FUNDAMENTALS WE RISK FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AMONG FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AS WELL AS FAILURE IN NAMIBIA. THE MINIMAL PROFIT TO BE GAINED NOW BY TRYING TO PAPER OVER OR OBFUSCATE OUR DIFFERENCES IS SIMPLY NOT WORTH THAT LONGER TERM COST.

UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I SEE NO BENEFIT TO BE GAINED - AND SOME COST TO BE INCURRED - BY MOVING AHEAD ON ANY OF THE OTHER WORK THE CONTACT GROUP HAD UNDERWAY OR CONTEMPLATED. I DO NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, BELIEVE IT WISE TO PROCEED WITH OUR LETTER TO THE

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SAG SO LONG AS WE REMAIN FAR APART ON FUNDAMENTALS, SINCE WE WILL ONLY BE CONTRIBUTING TO LATER MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE SAG AND OPENING OURSELVES TO CHARGES OF BAD FAITH.

LET US, THEN, RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. CAN WE AGREE ON THE RELATIONSHIP - I DO NOT SAY LINKAGE - BETWEEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA? CAN WE AGREE THAT WE WILL ALL FOLLOW A SIMILAR LINE WHEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH SWAPO, ANGOLA, THE FRONT LINE STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND CUBA? IF WE CAN, THEN WE SHOULD PLAN ON A POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING SOON TO WORK OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT ON HOW WE CAN, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, USE OUR INFLUENCE ON THE VARIOUS RELEVANT PARTIES TO BRING ABOUT THE OUTCOME WE SEEK. WE SHOULD, AS WELL, THEN RETURN OUR AFRICAN EXPERTS TO CONSIDERATION OF OUR LETTER TO THE SAG, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, THE ISSUE OF HOW WE HANDLE THE NAMIBIA QUESTION AT THE UNGA, ETC. IF WE CANNOT AGREE, THEN WE OUGHT TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO BREAK THAT NEWS TO THE PARTIES AND OUR PUBLICS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOON.

SINCERELY, AL.''

GILMOUR

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