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FM LUANDA 171505Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAPETOWN BONN PARIS OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK
LISBON

INFO SAVING LAGOS SALISBURY MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA GABORONE

CUBAN WITHDRAWAL: US/ANGOLA TALKS

1. THE U.S. MAY NOT WANT ADVICE FROM US ON THE LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE IN BILATERAL TALKS WITH ANGOLANS BUT IN CASE WE DO GET AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THAT LINE IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF WE INDICATE WHAT SEEM TO US IN LUANDA SOME PROBABLE ANGOLAN POSITIONS AND THE SORT OF RESPONSES LIKELY TO BE DEMANDED FROM THE AMERICANS.
2. AS THEY REPEATEDLY MAKE CLEAR THE ANGOLANS SEE THE CUBANS NOT AS A PROBLEM BUT AS A RESPONSE TO A PROBLEM, THAT OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION. IF THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO STAND ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS WITH DOS SANTOS AND HIS MEN IT MUST, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, ADDRESS THAT CENTRAL PROBLEM AND INDICATE FROM THE START THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATES THE LEGITIMACY AND, FOR THE ANGOLANS, THE PRIMACY OF THAT CONCERN.
3. I WOULD EXPECT THE ANGOLANS TO DEMAND AS THE PRICE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL SOME FAIRLY SPECIFIC ASSURANCES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:
 - A) THE U.S. WILL ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THIS MEANS NOT ONLY DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BUT RECOGNITION THAT THE MARXIST MPLA IS THE LEGITIMATE PARTY IN POWER, AND A WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO FULL POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA.
 - B) THE U.S. WILL ESCHEW AND WILL INSIST UPON THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ABANDONING ALL MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND OTHER DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS WITHIN ANGOLA. (THE DITCHING OF SAVIMBI IS BOUND TO BE PART OF THE ANGOLAN BOTTOM LINE.)
 - C) THE U.S. WILL RECOGNISE THAT JUST AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA WILL SATISFY A MAJOR DEMAND OF SOUTH AFRICA IN MATTERS OF DEFENCE SO ANGOLA WILL REQUIRE A CORRESPONDING ASSURANCE AGAINST THE THREAT OF ATTACK FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
4. THE THIRD REQUIREMENT COULD BE A MAJOR THEME IN THE TALKS. A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND POSSIBLY NEUTRAL NAMIBIA WOULD IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL, PERHAPS EVEN SUFFICIENT, ASSURANCE. ANGOLANS HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT WITH A FREE NAMIBIA AND THE KALAHARI DESERT THEY WOULD FEEL WELL PROTECTED. BUT OTHER AND ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES COULD BE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING A TACIT AGREEMENT ON DEFENCE MATTERS REACHED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE ANGOLANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS: THE POSSIBLE PROVISION IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY THE US ; PERHAPS EVEN THE DEVELOPMENT, WITH U.S. BLESSING, OF REGIONAL DEFENCE AGREEMENTS WITH NEIGHBOURING AFRICAN STATES.

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5. THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ANGOLAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES IS A POINT WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY STRESSED TO MR HAIG (YOUR TELNO 1205 TO WASHINGTON) . CURRENT ANGOLAN MISTRUST OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS SUCH THAT THE GENERAL MANNER OF THE U.S. DEMARCHE WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT. THE AMERICANS HAVE SOME STRONG CARDS TO PLAY BUT THE ANGOLANS WILL BE WARY OF THE QUOTE ARROGANCE OF POWER UNQUOTE SYNDROME. THEY NEED AND WANT PEACE WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. THEY NEED AND WANT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE U.S. BUT THEY ARE ALSO, AND WITH GOOD REASON, VERY AFRAID OF SOUTH AFRICA AND VERY AFRAID THAT THE U.S. IS MOVING TOWARDS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT COUNTRY AKIN TO THAT ALREADY ESTABLISHED WITH ISRAEL. THEY HAVE TO BE PERSUADED THAT THE U.S. WANTS A NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM AND NOT MERELY A REPLAY OF THE GEOPOLITICAL MATCH WHICH THE U.S. LOST IN 1975.

6. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO MAKE FULL ALLOWANCE FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY DIFFICULTIES UNDER WHICH THIS FRAGILE GOVERNMENT LABOURS. THEY HAVE NEVER KNOWN NORMALCY. THEY HAVE NEVER GOVERNED WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE CUBANS. EVEN IF WE TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD - AS I THINK WE SHOULD - AND ACCEPT THE READINESS TO DISPENSE WITH THE CUBAN FORCES ONCE THE EXTERNAL THREAT IS REMOVED IT WOULD STILL BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THEM TO THROW AWAY THE CRUTCH AND WALK, I.E. THE WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE PHASED OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD IF INTERNAL STABILITY IS NOT TO BE THREATENED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO EVOKE SOVIET OBSTRUCTION WHICH MUST BE COUNTED A POSSIBILITY IN SPITE OF SUCH ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY AS THAT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 327 (UNLESS OF COURSE SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE IS SECURED AS PART OF A WIDER DEAL).

7. I APPRECIATE THAT MUCH OF THIS MAY BE INDIGESTIBLE IN WASHINGTON BUT CAN SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF THE QUOTE-PARALLEL-UNQUOTE STRATEGY SUCCEEDING UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO ADOPT TOWARDS THE ANGOLANS A REASONABLY SYMPATHETIC LINE.
FCO PASS AND SAVING TO LAGOS SALISBURY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM

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ADVANCED

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