

77. Telegram From the Defense Attaché's Office in the United Kingdom to the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

London, April 8, 1982, 1354Z

N03820. Subj: IR 6.836 0066 82/UK/AR/FA/Senior Royal Navy Views on Current Falkland Island Issue (U).

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel.

1. (U) Ctry: United Kingdom (UK), Falkland Islands (FA), Argentina (AR).

2. (U) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

3. (U) Title: Senior Royal Navy views on current Falkland Island issue.

4. (U) Date of info: 820407.

5. (U) Orig: See FM line.

6. (U) Req Ref: U-UCR-42080/Continues.

7. (U) Source: Chief of Naval Staff.

8. (U) Summary: Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, amplifies to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the implications of Defence Secretary Nott announcement in Parliament on 820407 regarding Falkland Islands exclusion zone.²

9A. (C/Noform) Details:

1. (U) During early evening 820407 orig was called at home by the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] requesting I visit town residence of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at 2230 local 820407 to discuss an announcement to be made in House of Commons that evening. Orig went to the Admiral's flat at Admiralty Arch near Trafalgar Square at the

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982. Confidential; Immediate; Noform. Sent for information to USCINCEUR Vaihingen, USAFE COIC Ramstein, FICEURLANT, TFC Boerfink, [*text not declassified*], Department of State, COMNAVINTCOM, CNO, [*text not declassified*], USCINCSO, [*text not declassified*], NFOIO, CMC, CINCUSNAVEUR, [*text not declassified*], [*text not declassified*], and [*text not declassified*]. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Weinberger saw the telegram on April 8.

² See Document 78 and footnote 2 thereto.

appointed time and was escorted into the living room where [*name not declassified*] and orig sat down over a scotch and had a friendly chat.

2. (C/NoFORN) After a few pleasantries, [*name not declassified*] went directly to the point indicating that Defence Secretary Nott would be summing up the discussions in the House of Commons within a few minutes and would be announcing the Falkland exclusion zone declaration. [*name not declassified*] then went on to quote directly the words of the declaration, summarized in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] added that he was not sure if Nott would indicate that Article 51 of the UN charter³ was certainly applicable to the declaration; however, he said it was and would most certainly be evoked.

3. (C/NoFORN) [*name not declassified*] in this one-on-one discussion made it clear the British Government was taking deliberate and direct military moves they felt were a totally appropriate response in continuing the discussion—by now in no way a social chat, [*name not declassified*] did his part in sending the signal to the US that the British intend to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the rights of the crown. [*name not declassified*] chose his words carefully, speaking as he does in direct terms, conveying a seriousness to the situation he obviously considered necessary to express.

4. (C/NoFORN) [*name not declassified*] returning to the exclusion zone declaration spoke the obvious in stressing the probability of sinking Argentine ships which could result from the declaration. He stressed there would be no hesitancy on the British part to enforce the exclusion zone.

5. (C/NoFORN) [*name not declassified*] shifted to the American role, acknowledging Secretary of State Haig's impending arrival in London. Carefully selecting his words, he evoked the long-term ties between the US/UK. Emphasizing what some in the UK sense as fence-straddling by the US. (He described the sense as having one foot firmly planted on one side and on the other the foot a little off the ground.) [*name not declassified*] as too gracious to even suggest he shared this opinion, but the point was made.

9B. (C/NoFORN) Orig comments: Admiral [*name not declassified*] looked rested—although the hours he has been keeping have clearly kept him on the run. His message was totally clear but issued in a

³ Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

quiet, direct tone. Certainly, the assembled force under full combat orders are mounted up, ready to go into a hostile situation, and confident of success, this notwithstanding they were forced to move out more quickly than might be desired.

(1) (C/NOFORN) Implied in [*name not declassified*] message and picked up again between the lines in recent days within the Ministry of Defence is a feeling that America perhaps does not think the British will initiate direct military action. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] point in having this one-on-one was to relay the serious intentions the UK has to use force if diplomacy doesn't work. The UK appears willing to accept long-term economic difficulties associated with a hostile confrontation, especially if it drags out over weeks.

(2) (C/NOFORN) [*name not declassified*] certainly expressed the hope that diplomacy would work.

[Omitted here is dissemination information.]