

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 12 APRIL  
1982 AT 1210 HOURS

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## Present:

The Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary

Secretary of State for Defence

Mr. Clive Whitmore

The Hon. Alexander M. Haig

General Vernon Walters

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

Mr. David Gompert

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The Prime Minister said that she and her colleagues had now been able to have a general discussion on the proposals which Mr. Haig and his party had outlined earlier in the morning. They were very grateful for the tremendous amount of work which the United States had done. They had a number of questions. First, they wondered what the Americans thought would happen if no final settlement had been reached by 31 December 1982. Our fear was that the Argentinians might re-invade the Falkland Islands, especially if, in the meantime, the runway had been lengthened. A new factor in such a situation would be that the United States would be directly involved, through their membership of the Special Commission, as well as the United Kingdom.

Mr. Haig said that the very fact that the United States would be engaged would be a deterrent to any further aggressive action by the Argentine. Mr. Enders added that if nine months of the new system of government for the Falkland Islands envisaged by the American proposals generated a new spirit, then it would not matter too much if negotiations were still continuing on 31 December 1982 and no agreement had been reached.

The Prime Minister said that in order to get the American proposals through the House of Commons, the British Government would have to lay a great deal of emphasis on the preservation of the principle of self determination for the islanders. We

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should have to quote Article 1(2) and Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. We recognised, however, that Argentina would be saying different things about the agreement from the British Government.

Mr. Haig said that although it would cause problems, he accepted that the British Government would have to give prominence to self-determination. But he thought that British Ministers would be able to say with complete honesty that the agreement did not in any way prejudice the principle of self-determination. They would be able to claim with complete justice that they were not selling out the Falkland Islanders. The Prime Minister was right, however, when she said that President Galtieri would present the agreement in a completely different light. He would tell the Argentines that it represented a substantial change in the Falkland Islands' <sup>status</sup> in favour of the Argentine.

The Prime Minister went on to say that it would be impossible to let the Argentine flag continue to fly, and it certainly could not do so over the Governor's house.

Mr. Haig said that he envisaged that all three Commissioners would fly their own flags at the Commission's headquarters.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, in that case, the headquarters could not be in Government House. It would have to be somewhere else.

The Prime Minister said that she was not clear what would happen to South Georgia under the American proposals. Britain had an absolute title to this island, and our position would have to be that the British Antarctic Survey would return as the traditional local administration.

Mr. Haig said that he saw no problem about South Georgia.

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The Prime Minister said that although British submarines in the demilitarised zone would leave as the Argentinian forces withdrew, the British Task Force would continue to proceed southwards, though it would not enter the demilitarised zone. This was essential, since the British Government could not afford to let the Argentinians bluff them a second time. One concession she might be prepared to make was that the Task Force could stop at a point as far from the Falkland Islands as Argentina was from the Islands. Anything less would be unacceptable to Parliament. The Secretary of State for Defence added that we would bring back the Task Force only when Argentinian withdrawal was complete.

Mr. Haig said that he hoped that once an agreement had been reached, the Task Force would be held in a stand-off position. Mr. Enders added that what the Prime Minister had said about the Task Force might be difficult for the Argentines to accept. President Galtieri would <sup>find</sup> it hard to explain to his public why the British fleet was continuing to sail southwards when Argentinian forces were leaving the Falkland Islands.

At this point British Ministers were joined by Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Ian Sinclair, Mr. Wade-Gery and Mr. Ure, and the American party by Mr. Scott Gudgeon. The meeting then considered the American draft agreement in detail.

The Prime Minister said that the British side would have to look closely at the reference to UNGA Resolutions in paragraph 1 of the draft agreement. There was a risk that the Argentines would use these to try to reinforce their claim to sovereignty and to pre-judge the final negotiations envisaged in part 7 of the proposed agreement.

As regards paragraph 2, it was agreed that British officials should look at the size and centre points of the demilitarised areas. It was also accepted that there would need to be a reference to local police in this paragraph.

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The Prime Minister said that the wording of paragraph 3 would need to be examined particularly closely by officials since she was not prepared to pull back the Task Force from the date of the agreement. It would have to continue: it was Britain's insurance policy.

The Prime Minister said that paragraph 4 would need to contain a reference to the need for each special Commissioner to be supported by a small team of an agreed size.

Mr. Haig said that paragraph 5 was the most sensitive part of the whole proposal, and the agreement would stand or fall by it. He was not certain that he would be able to get the Argentines to accept it in its present form. The key issue was the Governor. They wanted to keep their Governor, but he had told President Galtieri that the best solution he could conceive of was a three-party arrangement in which the Argentine, British and American Governments were represented equally. But if the British insisted on moving away from this position, he did not believe that President Galtieri would be able to go along with the paragraph. The matter was very finely balanced indeed. Mr. Enders added that in fact the arrangement was not equal in practice because of the dominant part to be played by the executive and legislative councils.

The Prime Minister said that if the present Argentinian Governor was appointed as a Commissioner, the British Government would have to appoint Mr. Hunt as our Commissioner.

Mr. Ure added that the Government office block would probably be the best place for the Commission to have its headquarters.

The Prime Minister asked whether paragraph 8 should make it clear that if the negotiations had not been completed by 31 December 1982, the interim arrangements would continue.

/Mr. Haig

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Mr. Haig said that a provision of that kind would be dynamite for the Argentines, since they would see it as removing any incentive for the United Kingdom to negotiate. What had to be remembered was that if the agreement came into force, the situation would never be the same again since the United States would be directly involved. He believed that the outcome of the negotiations would be either a long-term agreement or another crisis.

The meeting ended at 1345.

*Jan.*

12 April 1982