

Manufactured (420) 17/4 TYPISTS
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

34
(29)
[Bcd K131
171155Z]

PS (6)
~~PS/...~~ Ps/Mr. Hurd
PS/MR ONSLOW
~~PS/MR RIEKIND~~
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.
PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/HKGD
Hd ESS
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE
DIO

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

Then to Typists
[D/By 171145Z]

LL0 195/17

00 F C O DESKBY 171145Z

00 WASHINGTON

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 UKDEL NATO

PP PARIS

PP BONN

GRS 1040

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 171145Z APRIL 82
FM MOSCOW 171000Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 17TH APRIL
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY PARIS AND BONN

F C O TELNO 460 (NOT TO ALL); FALKLAND ISLANDS: SOVIET ATTITUDE.

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON SEMEONOV, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT IN THE MFA, TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TUR. INDICATING THAT MY CALL WAS A NATURAL FOLLOW-UP TO MY EARLIER NOTIFICATION OF THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, I READ, AND GAVE SEMEONOV ON A PERSONAL BASIS, A SPEAKING NOTE CONTAINING THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 2 OF TUR. SEMEONOV UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY TO HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION COVERED THE SUBJECTS BELOW, THE FIRST THREE OF WHICH SEMEONOV RAISED IN RESPONSE TO MY SPEAKING NOTE.
A. RETURN OF THE ISLANDS TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. SEMEONOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT THIS INTENTION ACCOUNTED TO AN ATTEMPT TO RETURN THE FALKLANDS TO A COLONIAL STATUS AND THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY READ FROM A MANUSCRIPT NOTE A FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION:

'' WE CONSIDER IMPERMISSIBLE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM TO RE-ESTABLISH COLONIAL STATUS AND WE OPENLY OPPOSE SUCH ATTEMPTS. WE QUALIFY THEM AS CONTRADICTORY TO THE DECISION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DECOLONISATION OF THESE ISLANDS AND AS CREATING A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY''.

IN REPLY I STRESSED THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH RIGHT UP TO AND BEYOND THE NEW YORK MEETING IN FEBRUARY AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS. THROUGHOUT WE HAD BEEN GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION AND THE PARAMOUNTRY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

B. UN CHARTER ARTICLE 51.

SEMEONOV DISPUTED THAT BRITAIN HAD FULL RIGHTS TO USE FORCE. IT WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE. SEMEONOV CLAIMED TO FIND AMBIGUITIES IN YOUR SPEECH IN THE COMMONS ON 14 APRIL OVER THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ARTICLE 51 WAS BEING INVOKED FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITAIN OR THE DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I SAID I HAD NOTED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARTICLE 51. I HAD READ THAT ARTICLE AGAIN AND WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT IT COVERED THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE WITHOUT MAKING DISTINCTIONS ABOUT WHAT PORTION OF TERRITORY HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN

HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN BRITISH FOR 150 YEARS, AND WISHED TO REMAIN SO. IT WAS FOR THEM THAT WE WOULD EVOKE ARTICLE 51. THE PRINCIPLE THAT FORCE COULD BE USED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS WAS ONE WHICH BRITAIN AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT ACCEPTED. I THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION TOO WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IT ENDORSED.

C. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.

SEMEONOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED BRITAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONFLICT BECAUSE ITS PROCRASTINATION OVER 17 YEARS HAD LED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. I SAID I FOUND HIS COMMENT VERY DISAPPOINTING. I COULD NOT SEE HOW, WHEN THE LAST COMMUNIQUE OF THE ANGLO/ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REFERRED TO THEIR CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE AND WHEN THE FALKLANDS HAD SHORTLY THEREAFTER BEEN SUBJECTED WITHOUT WARNING TO NAKED AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET UNION COULD MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT BRITAIN WAS RESPONSIBLE. I WOULD REPORT MR SEMEONOV'S STATEMENT WITH GREAT REGRET, THE MORE SO AS THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED TO PURSUE A PRINCIPLED FOREIGN POLICY. WE LOOKED FOR SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION 502, FOR RESPECT FOR THE INHABITANTS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (A POINT THE SOVIET UNION USUALLY MADE MUCH OF), AND CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A WAY TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.

D. SOVIET UNION'S PRINCIPLED POSITION.

SEMEONOV CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID HAVE A PRINCIPLED POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON DECOLONISATION AND AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE. THE SOVIET UNION "REGRETTED THAT ARGENTINA HAD USED FORCE" BUT IT WAS BRITAIN WHICH HAD CREATED THE SITUATION BY BRINGING TALKS TO STALEMATE. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS CLEAR. SEMEONOV AGAIN REMINDED ME OF THE PASSAGE IN GROMYKO'S SPEECH IN BELGRADE (MY TELNO 181, PARA 2(1)), CALLING FOR A CONSIDERED APPROACH TO DISPUTES. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR THE FULFILMENT OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. BUT NOW BRITAIN THREATENED FORCE AND HAD ALREADY APPLIED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

TWO WRONGS DID NOT MAKE A RIGHT. I AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 IN ALL ITS PARTS.

E. PRESS COMMENT.

I SAID I HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE THAT UNTIL TWO DAYS AGO THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE IN THE SOVIET PRESS TO THE FACT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WAS MANDATORY AND CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCOUNT IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES

THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF PRESS TREATMENT OF THE CRISIS SEMEONOV COMPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH PRESS DISTORTED THE SOVIET POSITION AND PROPAGATED FLAT UNTRUTHS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE US WAS SUPPLYING BRITAIN WITH INTELLIGENCE BUT NOW THE PRESS ALLEGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DOING LIKEWISE FOR ARGENTINA. THIS WAS SIMPLY AN INVENTION. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON THIS, SEMEONOV CONFIRMED THAT WE COULD TAKE THIS AS A FORMAL DENIAL.

3. IN CONCLUSION SEMEONOV REPEATED THE HOPE HE HAD EXPRESSED AT MY LAST CALL THAT BRITAIN WOULD USE ITS POLITICAL WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THREATENING FORCE. HE FEARED THAT GOVERNMENT SPEECHES WERE TOUGH AND BIASED. PASSION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERTAKE COLD REASON. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT MORE POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION. 25 APRIL WAS ALREADY WORRYINGLY NEAR. SEMEONOV SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL MIGHT USE THE FLALKLANDS CRISIS AS COVER FOR AGGRESSION. I STRESSED HMG'S SERIOUS SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION UPON THE PRE-CONDITION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS BUT FORMALLY REJECTED THE SUGGESTION THAT BRITAIN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE. I WENT ON TO STRESS THE DEGREE OF UNITY SHOWN IN PARLIAMENT AND THROUGHOUT BRITAIN FOR HMG'S ACTIONS, AND TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED FOR OUR POSITION. (BY READING OUR THE LIST OF CONDEMNATIONS OF ARGENTINA ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 51).

BROOKE TURNER

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