

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

**IMMEDIATE**

4

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS

PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIFKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

*Sir Armstrong* . DIO

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

DESKBY 190730Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190001Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 18 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

YOUR TELNO 269: FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. BEFORE COMMENTING SPECIFICALLY ON YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE MY OWN POSITION CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH THIS MEANS REPEATING SOME OF WHAT I HAVE SAID IN EARLIER TELEGRAMS, PARTICULARLY IN MY TELNO 480.

2. SINCE I RETURNED FROM LONDON LAST MONDAY, I HAVE BEEN RACKING MY BRAINS TO SEE IF, IN THE EVENT OF HAIG FAILING, THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH WE COULD RETAIN THE INITIATIVE HERE WITHOUT PRECIPITATING CALLS ON US TO HALT OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS, WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO. THIS WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WHICH WE WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY ISOLATED EVEN FROM OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, HOWEVER ROBUST SOME OF THEM MAY BE NOW.

3. I AM STILL WHOLLY CONVINCED THAT, IF WE INITIATED A STRAIGHT FORWARD CALL IN THE COUNCIL FOR ARGENTINA TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 WITH OR WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, OR IF WE INVOKED THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR A SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION OR ANY UN MECHANISM OF THAT KIND, EVEN IF ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE EG "TO BRING ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502", WE WOULD PRECIPITATE PRECISELY THE SITUATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE IE A CALL ON US TO HALT THE FLEET AND SUSPEND THE MEZ, PENDING WHATEVER ACTION THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ASKED TO TAKE. WE COULD OF COURSE WITHDRAW OUR RESOLUTION OR REFUSE TO ACCEPT AMENDMENTS BUT THERE WOULD BE NO AVOIDING A COUNTER-DRAFT WHICH WOULD PUT US ON THE SPOT. TO PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL, I AM STILL VERY MUCH OF THE VIEW WHICH I PUT TO YOU IN LONDON AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS IE THAT WE PEAKED WITH SCR 502 AND THAT IT IS VERY HARD TO ENVISAGE ANY FURTHER POSITIVE ACTION WHICH WE COULD TAKE IN THE UN WITHOUT COURTING TROUBLE.

4. IT WAS WITH THE ABOVE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I ADVANCED THE IDEAS IN MY TELNOS 480 AND 481. I INTENDED THEM TO ILLUSTRATE, WITH THE PROS AND CONS, THE ONLY KIND OF INITIATIVE WHICH WE COULD TAKE WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND WITHOUT TYING OUR HANDS MILITARILY FOR MORE THAN A STRICTLY LIMITED PERIOD. I WAS NOT ADVOCATING THE IDEAS AS SUCH, SO MUCH AS POINTING OUT THAT IF WE WANTED TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE ONLY WAY WE COULD DO SO WOULD BE TO PUT FORWARD A SUBSTANTIVE PACKAGE. THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 481 SEEMED TO ME TO BE THE MAXIMUM THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE AMENDMENT. IF A DRAFT ON THESE LINES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MINISTERS, THE BEST WAY FOR US TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE TO CONTINUE TO WAIT UNTIL SOMEONE ELSE CALLS FOR RESUMED PROCEEDINGS THERE. I WOULD CONTINUE TO DO MY BEST TO POSTPONE THIS MOMENT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND, ONCE BACK IN THE COUNCIL, WOULD USE EVERY MANOEUVRE AT MY DISPOSAL TO PROLONG DISCUSSION AND DELAY THE MOMENT WHEN WE WERE DRIVEN INTO A CORNER AND OBLIGED TO VETO. I COULD PROBABLY HOLD OUT FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THERE ARE PLENTY OF POSSIBILITIES.

5. EVEN IF MINISTERS COULD ACCEPT SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF MY TELNO 481, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH A RESOLUTION ADOPTED, MUCH MORE SO THAN SCR 502, WHICH WE ACHIEVED ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD ANTI-PATHY TO THE USE OF FORCE. IN THE PRESENT CASE IT WOULD BE WE WHO WOULD BE SEEN TO BE ON THE POINT OF USING FORCE. WE COULD EXPLOIT THIS AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THE FAINT-HEARTED TO ACCEPT OUR RESOLUTION, BUT THERE WOULD BE A RISK THAT SOMEONE WOULD TABLE AN INTERIM RESOLUTION CALLING ON US NOT TO USE FORCE WHILE OUR PROPOSALS WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION.

6. I WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE HAVE A HOPE OF GETTING A RESOLUTION THROUGH IN LESS THAN THREE OR FOUR DAYS FROM SCRATCH. THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT LET ME BULLDOZE THEM A SECOND TIME. FIRST, UNLESS I INVITED DEFEAT IN A PROCEDURAL VOTE, I WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW 24 HOURS FOR COSTA MENDEZ TO GET HERE (AN INEVITABLE DEMAND). THEN THE COUNCIL WOULD WANT TO HEAR HIS VIEWS IN PUBLIC DEBATE (THE RUSSIANS/PANAMANIAN WOULD SEE TO THAT). IF HE OBJECTED TO THE PACKAGE, WEAK SISTERS MIGHT ABSTAIN IN THE VOTE IF I REFUSED TO ACCEPT AMENDMENTS, ON THE GROUND THAT NO GOOD WOULD COME OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. THERE WOULD BE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS (SOME MENTIONED IN MY TELNO 480) WHICH I NEED NOT SPELL OUT AGAIN. BUT, ALL IN ALL, THERE WOULD BE AN OUTSIDE SPORTING CHANCE OF PULLING IT OFF AND, IF WE FAILED THROUGH LACK OF VOTES OR A VETO, WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO JUSTIFY THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF FORCE IF AND WHEN THE STORM BREAKS HERE.

7. THIS WOULD NOT BE TRUE OF THE TEXT IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WHICH WOULD PRECIPITATE THE SITUATION WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID. IT LEAVES THE FUTURE OF OUR TASK FORCE AMBIGUOUS AND THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO SOUTH GEORGIA ETC WOULD AROUSE SUSPICION THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO SEIZE SOUTH GEORGIA AS A BASE AND NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH WITH OUR FLEET HOVERING ROUND THE FALKLANDS. FAIR ENOUGH TO REASONABLE PEOPLE, BUT THIS IS NOT A REASONABLE PLACE. WE WOULD GET AMENDMENTS DESIGNED TO "CLARIFY" THESE SITUATIONS WHICH I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO VETO, OR WITHDRAW THE RESOLUTION, LEAVING THE FIELD OPEN TO A COUNTER-DRAFT WITH THE OBVIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

ONE OR TWO FINAL POINTS. FIRST, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE "DO GOODERS" OR OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO CALL THE COUNCIL WHILE HAIG IS STILL IN ACTION. IF THEY DO, WE SHOULD BRING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH TO JOIN US IN A TRIPLE VETO OF ANYTHING UNACCEPTABLE TO US ON THE GROUND THAT IT CUT ACROSS HAIG'S EFFORTS.

9. SECONDLY, IF HAIG FAILS AND IF IT IS DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO VALID INITIATIVE WHICH WE CAN TAKE IN THE COUNCIL, WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE AMERICANS COOPERATE WITH US TO THE FULL HERE (NOT EASY WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK IN THE SADDLE). THERE IS AN EXPECTATION HERE THAT, WIN OR LOSE, THE AMERICANS WILL AT SOME STAGE REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON HAIG'S MISSION EVEN THOUGH IT IS OUTSIDE THE UN FRAMEWORK - THE ARGUMENT BEING THAT IT IS BASED ON SCR 502. IF HAIG FAILED AND THE AMERICANS DECIDED THAT THEY MUST TAKE SOME ACTION OF THIS KIND, THE EFFECT ON OUR CAUSE COULD BE SERIOUS UNLESS WE HAD WORKED OUT WITH THEM IN ADVANCE A LINE TO TAKE WHICH WOULD ENABLE BOTH OF US (THIS MIGHT JUST ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH TO FOLLOW SUIT) TO VETO ANYTHING UNDESIRABLE. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD MAKE LIFE A GREAT DEAL EASIER FOR US, PARTICULARLY WITH A GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION IN MIND. HENCE I STRONGLY ENDORSE THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE TO HAIG (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 749 TO WASHINGTON).

PARSONS

NNNN

7777

