



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April, 1982

Dear John,

Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

Following discussion in ODSA this morning, we have drafted three telegrams to Washington, the first setting out our general view of the visit, the second containing a message from Haig, and a third containing the list of amendments required by us to the latest proposals. I would be grateful for your agreement that these can be despatched as soon as possible.

There was some discussion in ODSA this morning of the possibility of a UN peace-keeping force on the Islands and it was suggested that a new paragraph should be drafted which could be added to the existing texts. I enclose a draft accordingly. However, Mr Pym thinks that it would be better not to send the text of this to the Americans at this stage but rather to keep it in reserve in case either we run into difficulty over the US security guarantee, or we judge that a new element in the text would be helpful presentationally. We also have in mind that we must be careful not to let the Americans use a UN force suggestion in order to get themselves off the hook of a bilateral security guarantee. I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of ODSA.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street



New paragraph (to precede paragraph 8)

"(A) The two Governments agree to invite the UN Security Council to arrange for the stationing in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), for the duration of the interim period referred to in paragraph 8(A) of this agreement, of a [peace-keeping force] [observer force] of appropriate size and composition. The function of the force shall be to observe compliance by the two Governments with their obligations under paragraph 3 of this agreement and to report regularly thereon, through the Secretary General of the UN, to the Security Council.

(B) The United States Government has indicated that it will support such a request to the Security Council."

A consequential modification would be required to paragraph 5 to make it clear that the Special Interim Authority did not have the same function. One way of doing this would be to add at the end of paragraph 5 the phrase " . . . other than the obligations in paragraph 3 thereof."

OUT TELEGRAM

| | | |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------|
| | Classification and Caveats | Precedence/Deskby |
| ↓ | CONFIDENTIAL | IMMEDIATE |

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO 211500Z APRIL 82
7 TO ~~IMMEDIATE~~ ^{FLASH} WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
10 FALKLAND ISLANDS: MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON
11 1. My two IFT's contain a personal message from me to Haig
12 and a list of amendments to the Buenos Aires draft which the
13 Prime Minister and I consider essential.
14 2. In conveying these to the State Department I should like
15 you also to put across the following points in whatever way
16 you think best:
17 a. Unless Haig thinks otherwise, I suggest we begin our
18 talks by setting the scene for the work we have to do. I need
19 to know from Haig about the mood and conditions in Buenos
20 Aires and the possibility of relying on any agreement to which
21 the Argentinians may put their names. I should be glad also to
22 talk about the general Latin American, Central American and
23 Soviet angles. This is the background against which the text
24 and the amendments could then be considered. I do not want to
25 spend too much of my limited time with Haig ploughing through

///
//
/

| | | |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword drafts. |
| File number | Dept PRIVATE OFFICE | FALKLAND ISLANDS SPECIAL |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES | | |
| Telephone number | | |
| Authorised for despatch | | |
| Comcen reference | Time of despatch | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

| | | | |
|--|----------------------------|-----------|------|
| | Classification and Caveats | | Page |
| | CONFIDENTIAL | IMMEDIATE | 2. |

<<<<
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34

drafts.
 I shall have officials with me and if necessary they could be detached to go through texts separately.
 b. As Haig knows from my message to him of 15 April (my telno 730) a point of fundamental importance for Britain is that of the eventual American guarantee of the security of the Islands from any future Argentine aggression. Haig will know how little faith any British Government can have in Argentine good intentions. I shall want to talk to Haig about how best to arrange this and to related it to the other parts of any political solution.
 c. The Americans will appreciate that as the British military capability in the area develops, it will become all the more important to keep Argentina in the dark about how this might be used. I have enough respect for the Intelligence community to believe that their guesses will sometimes be close to the mark. I know too that there is a different tradition in the United States about discussing these matters in public. But Haig himself has underlined the importance of maintaining our military pressure, and he will understand that we do not want to see its effectiveness weakened by unnecessary publicity. There is pressure on us from the press here too, but we are holding the line that we are not going to speculate in public about these matters.
 3. I shall be telegraphing separately on the rest of the programme (your telno 1370). I attach importance to outside calls of the sort you have suggested and to the press side of the visit, and I do not want the talks with Haig to monopolise the time available. (Officials will, however, be available for talks in the State Department as necessary).

PYM
 NNNN

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|
| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO 211500Z APRIL 82
7 to FLASH WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
10 MIPT
11 FALKLANDS ISLANDS: MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON
12 1. Please deliver the following personal message from me to
13 Mr Haig as soon as possible.
14 BEGINS
15 In preparation for our talks tomorrow I am asking Nicko
16 Henderson to give you the amendments to the Buenos Aires
17 text which the Prime Minister and I consider essential. He will
18 be conveying one or two further points to which we attach
19 importance.
20 As background to our meeting it might be useful for you
21 to have the following summary of the reasons why the latest
22 draft would be far more difficult for Britain to consider
23 accepting than the version which we discussed earlier:
24 a. Withdrawal
25 The proposed arrangements are unequal and heavily favour

///
//
/

| | | | | | |
|---|--|------------------------|--|---|--|
| NNNN ends telegram | | BLANK | | Catchword Argentina | |
| File number | | Dept PRIVATE OFFICE | | Distribution Falkland Island Special | |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES | | | | | |
| Telephone number | | | | | |
| Authorised for despatch | | | | | |
| Comcen reference | | Time of despatch | | | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

2.

<<<<

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Argentina, despite her being the aggressor. For the second week after signature of the agreement Argentina would have several thousand troops with all their equipment in the Falkland Islands, while the nearest British forces (our submarines) would be several hours distant. Within fifteen days the provision that British forces should return to their usual operating bases or areas would apparently exclude most possible deployments in the South Atlantic.

b. Administration

To have nominees of the Argentine Government in the Councils in the Falklands would be undemocratic in the case of the Legislative Council and disproportionate in the case of the Executive Council. In effect, government would be shared between Britain and Argentina at the administrative level, as well as (with the United States) in the Special Interim Authority. British administration would thus be re-established to a far lesser degree than under the earlier draft.

c. Economic sanctions

The new draft would have these lifted before the completion of Argentinian withdrawal, thus contradicting the principle that withdrawal in accordance with the UN Resolution is the first requirement.

d. Relations with the mainland

The latest draft opens up the possibility, if not the probability, of an influx of Argentine people and businesses, combined with strong encouragement to the Islanders to leave. Britain would apparently still have the right to block proposals in this field from the Special Interim Authority, but the latest draft independently concedes the principle of facilitating contacts between the Islands and Argentina.

e. Future negotiations

The new text would exclude re-establishment of the status quo

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

ante

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

3.

<<<<

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

ante the invasion from the list of possible outcomes of negotiations
This does not preserve the fundamental principle that the Islanders
must choose their own future. Here too Britain would nominally
be free to refuse agreement to any outcome of the negotiations
which the Islanders did not accept. But there is a bias
in the relevant paragraph which would greatly restrict
our freedom to press for any outcome not involving early
transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

All in all, I think I was right to tell my colleagues
in the Ten yesterday that the general effect of the latest
draft - even presupposing Argentine goodwill, which in our eyes
is far from obvious - would be that Argentine withdrawal would be
delayed, the Argentine voice in the administration of the Islands
would be disproportionate, Argentine influence and pressure in
the Islands would be given free rein, and future negotiations
would be organised in a way which could only prejudice
the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The
result would be that in practice the Islanders would face the
choice between absorption into Argentina or abandonment of the
islands which have been their home in most cases for a
century and a half.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting the
Argentinians to accept of amendments. But I thought I should
leave you in no doubt about the gap which I see between their
present maximum and our own minimum.

I much look forward to our meeting tomorrow and to all that
I hope will come out of it - including something useful to you
in the OAS context, on which I was grateful for your latest
message. ENDS

///
//
/
34

NNNN ends
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

OUT TELEGRAM

| | | |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| | Classification and Caveats SECRET | Precedence/Deskby FLASH |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|

| | | |
|---------|----|---|
| ZCZC | 1 | ZCZC |
| GRS | 2 | GRS |
| CLASS | 3 | SECRET |
| CAVEATS | 4 | |
| DESKBY | 5 | |
| FM FCO | 6 | FM FCO 211600Z APRIL 82 |
| PRE/ADD | 7 | TO FLASH WASHINGTON |
| TEL NO | 8 | TELEGRAM NUMBER |
| | 9 | FALKLAND ISLANDS: MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON |
| | 10 | MY TWO IPTs |
| | 11 | 1. As promised in my personal message to Mr Haig, the |
| | 12 | following is the list of amendments to the Buenos Aires |
| | 13 | text which the Prime Minister and I consider essential. Please |
| | 14 | deliver the list immediately to Mr Haig. |
| | 15 | BEGINS |
| | 16 | <u>Paragraph 2.1</u> . Delete 'rescind' and substitute 'suspend |
| | 17 | enforcement of'. |
| | 18 | <u>Paragraph 2.2.1</u> (second sentence). Delete and substitute the |
| | 19 | following: |
| | 20 | 'Within the same time period the United Kingdom naval task |
| | 21 | force will stand off at a distance of at least 150 miles from |
| /// | 22 | any of the co-ordinate points.' |
| // | 23 | <u>Paragraph 2.2.2</u> . |
| / | 24 | a) Re-draft first sentence as follows: |
| | 25 | 'Within fifteen days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword and the |
| File number | Dept PRIVATE OFFICE | Distribution |
| Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES | | |
| Telephone number | | |
| Authorised for despatch | | |
| Comcen reference | Time of despatch | |

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

| | | | |
|--|----------------------------|-------|------|
| | Classification and Caveats | | Page |
| | SECRET | FLASH | 2. |

<<<<

1
2
3 and the United Kingdom shall have removed all their forces,
4 equipment and armaments from the zones'.
5 b) Re-draft second sentence as follows:
6 'Hereafter, the UK naval task force and submarines shall
7 revert to their normal duties.'
8 Paragraph_4
9 Delete 'From the date of this agreement, steps' and substitute
10 'On completion of the steps specified in paragraphs 2, 2.1, 2.2,
11 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above, the two Governments shall take measures
12 to terminate'....
13 Second_sentence
14 Delete 'without delay' and insert 'at the same time' and 'shall'.
15 Paragraph_5
16 Add 'Each representative may be supported by a staff of not more
17 than ten persons'.
18 Paragraph_6(A)
19 Delete second sentence and substitute:
20 'The traditional local administration shall be re-established,
21 including the Executive and Legislative Councils, each of which
22 shall be enlarged to include one representative of the Argentine
23 population resident on the Islands to be nominated by the
24 Special Interim Authority.'
25 Paragraph_6(A)
26 Delete third sentence.
27 Paragraph_7(A)
28 Delete and substitute:
29 'Pending a definitive settlement, the Special Interim Authority
30 shall make proposals to the two Governments to facilitate
31 and promote travel, transportation, communications (including
32 the movement of persons) and trade between the mainland and the
33 Islands. Such proposals shall simultaneously be transmitted to
34 the Executive and Legislative Councils for their views. The

///
//
/

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|------------------|
| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword two |
|--------------------|-------|------------------|

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

| | | | |
|--|----------------------------|-------|------|
| | Classification and Caveats | | Page |
| | SECRET | FLASH | 3. |

<<<<

1

2 two Governments undertake to respond as soon as possible to

3 such proposals. The Special Interim Authority shall monitor

4 the implementation of all such proposals agreed by the two

5 Governments'.

6 Paragraph 7(B)

7 Delete 'teaching' and 'property'. Clarification is required

8 of the meaning of the phrase 'on an equal basis'. Pending

9 such clarification, a reserve is put on this phrase.

10 Paragraph 8(A)

11 Delete and substitute:

12 'December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during

13 which the signatories shall negotiate mutually agreed conditions

14 for the definitive status of each of the three groups of Islands

15 in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter

16 of the United Nations and bearing in mind relevant General

17 Assembly Resolutions. The negotiations shall begin within

18 fifteen days of the signature of the present Agreement'.

19

20 PYM

21 NNNN

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

///

//

/

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|
| NNNN ends telegram | BLANK | Catchword |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|



R 1 APR 1982