

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 071745Z MAY 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 672 OF 7 MAY 1982  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

-7 MAY

*Mr. Lopez*  
*162*  
*Clark*  
*8/1*

YOUR TELNO 362: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I CALLED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR FIRST THING THIS MORNING (7 MAY). I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE (I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT: THE FINAL VERSION MEETS ALL MY POINTS).

2. I HAD DELIBERATELY ASKED TO SEE PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALONE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITHOUT RAFAEL AHMED'S MALIGNANT PRESENCE. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHY THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD COLLAPSED. ESSENTIALLY THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES HAD INSISTED THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE PRE-JUDGED AT THE OUTSET BY ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. THIS HAD IN TURN BECOME A PRECONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL. AN ASSOCIATED PROBLEM WAS THAT HAIG AND OTHERS HAD, FROM TIME TO TIME BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CIVILIAN NEGOTIATORS, ONLY TO FIND THAT THEY WERE REPUDIATED BY THE MILITARY AT THE LAST MOMENT. I THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT ENRIQUE ROS (WHO IS COMING TODAY TO NEW YORK TO IMPLIFY THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WHOM BOTH HE AND I KNOW WELL) WOULD PRESENT A REASONABLE FRONT ON THIS VITAL QUESTION. BUT WE WOULD NOT BE IMPRESSED BY ANYTHING WHICH DID NOT HAVE GALTIERI'S SIGNATURE ON IT.

3. I SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT, IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE PROGRESS AND NOT SIMPLY RAISE FALSE HOPES, PEREZ DE CUELLAR MUST CONCENTRATE AT THE OUTSET ON ACHIEVING CAST-IRON AGREEMENT (IE SIGNED BY GALTIERI IN WRITING) ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THESE MUST INCLUDE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. THE DETAILS COULD THEN BE FILLED IN EG THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, THE QUESTION OF A CONTACT GROUP, A UN UMBRELLA, DURATION, VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT, AUTHORITY AND COMPOSITION OF LOCALLY ELECTED AND APPOINTED BODIES AND SO ON. IT WOULD BE NO GOOD GOING

STRAIGHT TO QUESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE UNTIL HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DOUBT THAT THE ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITION OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT GOING TO SCUPPER HIS EXERCISE AS IT HAD SCUPPERED THE PREVIOUS ONES. I ADDED THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY OTHER DIFFICULTIES, BUT THIS WAS THE CENTRAL OBSTACLE.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTES AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION. HE WAS ALIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT SIMPLY BE USING HIM IN ORDER TO GET EITHER A CEASEFIRE AND ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, OR A BRITISH VETO OF A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE COMBINED WITH NEGOTIATIONS, THIS PUTTING THEM IN A BETTER DIPLOMATIC POSITION. I SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT WE TOO WERE USING HIM, SIMPLY IN ORDER TO BUY TIME. I COULD GIVE HIM MY WORD OF HONOUR THAT WE WERE TAKING HIS INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY AND IN TOTAL GOOD FAITH. HE ACCEPTED THIS.

5. AT THE END, I SAID THAT I HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM ALONE BECAUSE I FOUND RAFE AHMED'S UNHELPFUL INTERVENTIONS DISTRACTING AND TIRESOME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, AFTER OUR MEETING ON 6 MAY, HE HAD TOLD AHMED THAT, IF HE CONTINUED TO BEHAVE LIKE THAT, HIS USEFULNESS WOULD BE AT AN END. AHMED HAD EXCUSED HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT WALDHEIM HAD TRAINED HIM TO GIVE AN APPEARANCE OF TOUGHNESS AT MEETINGS SO THAT HE, WALDHEIM, COULD THEN DISPLAY FLEXIBILITY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS INFANTILE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED AND PROMISED ME THAT I WOULD HAVE NO MORE TROUBLE WITH AHMED WHO HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY CHASTISED. WE SHALL SEE. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AHMED WAS LUCKY THAT I WAS AN EVEN TEMPERED MAN.

PARSONS

NNNN