

File No.

OUTWARD

Department

TELEGRAM

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[TEXT]

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 679, 685 AND 686: FALKLANDS

1. We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. We therefore wish to reply quickly and constructively to the points made by the Secretary-General in your meetings yesterday. We should in particular deal today with the five points identified at the end of your telegram no 679 but should also state firmly ^{one position} on the highly difficult and delicate problem of the interim administration.

2. You should convey the following British position to the Secretary-General on the five points:

(a) Date of time 'T'. We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as

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both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces with a ceasefire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable, provided Argentina can guarantee to abide by it and assuming that we should have reasonable notice of the conclusion of the agreement.

(at least 24 hours)

(b) The length of the period of withdrawal. We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be ~~them being~~ withdrawn within 7 days.

(c) The phasing of the withdrawal of the Task Force. The arrangements for ^{British} withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all our naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to a ^{outside a zone} distance of 200 nautical miles ^{radius} from the Falkland Islands.

(d) Terminal date for diplomatic negotiations. It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations ^{when} ~~which~~ everyone knows ^{that} the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude ^{an agreement} ~~successfully~~ within a specified period. For this reason, we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression "target date" which appeared in his original proposals of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the ^{named} date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, we ~~should want~~ the agreement ^{would have} to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented and we ^{we} could want the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council ^(shortly before) the target date about next steps ^{do} concerning ~~the future status of~~ the Falkland Islands.

(Next steps could of course be either implementation of an agreement or continuation of negotiations)

(e) The format and venue for the negotiations. We hope that the Secretary-General will agree that the negotiations should take place under his auspices and as far as possible in his presence. When he cannot be present, we hope that his place will be taken by ^a representative. Because of the particular diplomatic pressures in New York, we should like the negotiations to take place elsewhere, perhaps Geneva, Ottawa ^{or} ~~Mexico City~~.

3. In amplification of points (b) and (c) above, ^(please suggest) to the Secretary General that he might build on the

key point of his original proposals - that a number of things should all begin happening at time 'T' - in the following way. With effect from time 'T' the parties, might undertake ^{not only} to cease fire ^{and} to begin withdrawing from the Zone of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands, ^{but also} not to introduce any further military forces into that Zone (except for the purposes of Argentine withdrawal, and then under UN supervision), to suspend the enforcement of the ~~various zones now in operation~~ ^{around the Falkland Islands} and to take steps to

162.

terminate economic measures. The United Nations ^{in the Falkland as soon as possible after} administration would begin arriving ^{at} time 'T' and would verify withdrawal by both parties. We hope that the Secretary-General would report very frequently, perhaps daily, on the process and completion of withdrawal. By day 14, when withdrawal by both parties would have to be complete, the exclusion zones would be finally terminated, the

economic/

economic measures would end and the interim UN administration would be completely established. Neither side could introduce military forces into the 200 nautical mile zone throughout the interim period.

4 We ^{share} your ^{suspicion} that Argentina may hope to take over the Islands when the interim period ends. The points suggested under (d) above are of course designed to help in countering this. But we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable.

(You should tell the Secretary-General that Argentina in earlier negotiations was willing to accept the continuation of the Executive and Legislative Councils (although with two Argentine nominees on the Executive Council and one representative of the Argentine population of the Islands in each Council).)

What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN ^a interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function.

~~In effect, the UN would have the role envisaged in the US/Peruvian proposals for a Contact Group. If pressed~~

You may say that

the most we could accept by way of Argentine involvement ^{in interim administration} would be that a very few Argentine and British nationals could be included in the UN presence.

which was unacceptable
→ do
about

No. -
= different

→

45. On the framework for future negotiations, we are concerned that the Argentines may suggest language about General Assembly resolutions tending to favour the Argentine case on sovereignty (Paragraph 4 of your telno 685). (This kind of ploy produced, in Haig's first shuttle, a complex and contradictory paragraph about the terms of reference for the negotiations.) You should make clear to the Secretary General that to embark on this kind of thing would probably produce an endless ^{wrangle} language ~~about individual words~~. ^{what should be referred to} We would have to insist on references to self-determination or at least to the purposes ^{and} of principles of the charter. We therefore hope very much that the Secretary-General can keep the language about the subject for future negotiations very clear and simple. Why not stick to the words of the Secretary-General's paper of

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3 May (which of course echoed resolution 502) about the two Governments seeking 'a diplomatic resolution to their differences'? Alternatively, a completely neutral formula about the future status of the Islands would be acceptable.

56. Other important points in Ministers' minds are:

(a) the Argentine Junta or Galtieri personally should be identified with Argentine adherence to any agreement;

(b) any agreement must be about 'the Falkland Islands - Islas Malvinas', thus keeping the dependencies out of it.

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7.8 Meanwhile we are ensuring that you have received or will receive the texts of the previous draft agreements with which we might have been able to live: i.e. the document Haig took back from London after Easter, the BA version as amended by us for my visit to Washington on 22 April, and the final US/Peruvian proposals as modified by us. Furthermore documents and commentaries which you do not already have will be sent by bag. You will realise that these - particularly the two former drafts - contain many elements which we would not (not) wish to revive. In complying therefore with the Secretary General's ^{request} ~~report~~ to be told as much as possible of our previous negotiating stance you should restrict yourself as far as you can to supplying details of the US/Peruvian proposals, on the substance which he is already briefed. We recognise that the extent to which you can hold back will be conditioned by how much the Argentines are volunteering, or distorting, our earlier positions. At all events, you already know that any agreement which is to be considered seriously by us must (a) include the concept of ceasefire being unambiguously linked to an immediate start of Argentine troop withdrawal, (b) not prejudice in any way ^a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, (c) be compatible with a security guarantee e.g. by the U.S., and (d) avoid ^a de facto situation by which Argentina gained the Islands in default of a final settlement by a terminal date for the conclusion of negotiations.

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