

PA

IMMEDIATE

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32)

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)

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MY 2 IPTS: FALKLANDS.

1. AFTER THE EXPERIENCES OF THE PAST WEEKS, I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY OF US RATED VERY HIGH THE CHANCES THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR ANY MORE THAN THEY DID WITH HAIG AND THE PERUVIANS. TODAY'S EXPERIENCE BRINGS ME VERY CLOSE TO BELIEVING THAT THEY ARE STILL NOT INTERESTED IN REACHING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON TERMS WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND THAT IT IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A QUESTION OF WHO WRONG-FOOTS WHOM WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN.
2. QUITE APART FROM THEIR TOTALLY UNCHANGED AND UNSATISFACTORY RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, I AM FORTIFIED IN THIS BELIEF

RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, I AM FORTIFIED IN THIS BELIEF BY THEIR RENEWED INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING SOUTH GEORGIA, BY THEIR REINJECTION OF THE NOTION OF FREEDOM OF IMMIGRATION AND PURCHASE OF PROPERTY, AND BY THE FRIVOLITY OF THEIR INSISTENCE ON OUR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO A POINT 2,000 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ISLANDS IN PARALLEL WITH THEIR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF 150 MILES. ON THIS POINT, THEY KNOW PERFECTLY WELL THAT THE 2,000 MILE CONCEPT WAS INTRODUCED AT A TIME WHEN THE TASK FORCE WAS AT LEAST THAT FAR FROM THE FALKLANDS.

3. THEIR EMPHASIS ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND EXCLUSIVE UN ADMINISTRATION LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE AIMING TO WRONG-FOOT US BY PRESENTING US AS HAVING DESTROYED CHANCES OF AGREEMENT ON GROUNDS WHERE THEY COULD COUNT ON MAJORITY SUPPORT IN THE UN.

4. I DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO HAVE A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS EVENING, BUT HIS WHOLE MANNER DURING THE MEETING INDICATED THAT HE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION WITH A GENUINE CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. HE WAS IN A SOMBRE MOOD.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I PROPOSE THAT MY TACTICS TOMORROW SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS. THEY WOULD COMBINE GIVING THE ARGENTINES A LAST CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE A GENUINE CHANGE OF HEART AND, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO FAIL, LEAVING US ON THE RIGHT FOOT. I SHOULD CONFIRM TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AS I EFFECTIVELY DID THIS EVENING, THAT WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT UNTIL WE WERE SURE THAT WE WERE DISCUSSING A GENUINE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AND NOT SIMPLY A BRIEFLY DELAYED TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION TO ARGENTINA. I SHOULD CONFIRM TO HIM, AGAIN AS I SUGGESTED THIS EVENING, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WORTH MY PRODUCING FRESH LANGUAGE ON THE DETAILED POINTS IN THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT UNTIL HE HAD EXTRACTED A SPECIFIC FORMULATION FROM ROS ON THE QUESTION OF THE NON PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WOULD STUDY THIS FORMULATION AND REFER IT TO YOU FOR COMMENTS IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIC POINT. IF THERE WAS, WE COULD THEN GO ON TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT. IF THERE WASNOT, WE WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING WITH THE PRESENT EXERCISE.

6. AS REPORTED IN MY FIRST IPT, I EXPLAINED REPEATEDLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES' WAS NOT ENOUGH IN ITSELF. ARGENTINA DID NOT REGARD ITSELF AS QUOTE CLAIMING UNQUOTE SOVEREIGNTY. THEY REGARDED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AS AN ACTUALITY WHICH ONLY LACKED RECOGNITION BY US. HENCE, WE HAD TO INSIST ON THE ADDITIONAL PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S

ADDITIONAL PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S
APPARENTLY POSITIVE REMARKS IN PUBLIC ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY NOT BEING A
PRE-CONDITION REFERRED IN FACT TO THE IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION BY THE
UK OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. WE
WERE NOT DECEIVED BY THIS PHRASE: HENCE OUR INSISTENCE ON THE
LANGUAGE I HAD PROPOSED. IF THE ARGENTINES WERE GENUINE, WHY
DID THEY OBJECT TO THE INSERTION OF THIS LANGUAGE? NO ONE ON THE
OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE COULD PRODUCE AN ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THIS.

PARSONS

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