

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0730, 15 MAY 1982

UN

A
(UKMIS New York
telno.752)

Sir A Parsons' Tactics : 14 May

1. The Secretary-General agreed to delay presenting his paper until after Sir A Parsons had returned from consultations in the UK. He also agreed that it would be most helpful if the informal meeting of the Security Council were to be short and uncontentious. He would lobby to this end.

A
(UKMIS New York
telno.752)

Secretary-General/Argentina

2. The Secretary-General informed Sir A Parsons that he had pressed the Argentines hard on the question of Islander participation in the Interim Administration. He had heard, informally, that the Argentines might give way on this point. He would confirm this to Sir A Parsons in London on 15 May.

B
(UKMIS New York
telno.754)

Informal Consultations of Security Council

3. With the exception of an unhelpful intervention from Spain, the meeting of the Security Council passed without mishap. The Spaniards were concerned that a ceasefire should be maintained during the Secretary-General's negotiations. It is, however, Sir A Parsons' judgement that should the Secretary-General's efforts fail, the Council would support a ceasefire resolution.

C
(UKMIS New York
telno.755)

EC Briefing

4. The Argentines have been lobbying Members of the Ten in New York, claiming that the UK had been delaying the Secretary-General's negotiations. Sir A Parsons countered these allegations and underlined the need for the Community to extend its sanctions.

D
(UKMIS New York
telno.753)

Draft Interim Agreement

5. Sir A Parsons has requested further guidance on a number of points in the existing draft. In particular, he has proposed wording on Article 8 concerning the entry into force and continuation of the Agreement.

Secretary-General: Timing

E
(UKMIS New York
telno.750)

6. Despite press reports to the contrary, the Secretary-General has not imposed a 36 hour deadline for responses from the UK and Argentina. He has expressed the hope of achieving a successful negotiation shortly. The tenor of his remarks was optimistic.

US

F
(Washington
telno.1757)

Haig's Views on Current Situation and Negotiating Tactics

7. At a meeting at the State Department, Sir N Henderson was told that Mr Haig had telephoned from Ankara expressing concern over the President's call to the Prime Minister of

13 May. He did not believe that we were being intransigent and he thought that the Prime Minister had settled any doubts which President Reagan may have had on this score. Mr Haig had made the following points:-

- (a) we should ensure that we were not responsible (or could be held to be responsible) for any break down in the Secretary-General's negotiations;
- (b) the US would help verify the withdrawal of forces;
- (c) the discussions should concentrate on the Falkland Islands and not the Dependencies;
- (d) Haig recommended the US/Peruvian text concerning consultation with Islanders;
- (e) language on freedom of movement, preferably using a neutral formula, might be incorporated in a side letter rather than in the main text of the Agreement.

Sir N Henderson underlined our need for a guarantee that Argentina would not order the UN out at the end of the year and reoccupy the Islands. The involvement of the US in the Contact Group envisaged under the US/Peruvian plan had provided such a guarantee. The State Department doubted, however, whether the US would be acceptable under a UN plan because of its super power status.

US/Argentina

8. The State Department has passed to the Embassy a confidential record of a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador to the US. The Ambassador was anxious to emphasise to the Americans that there had been a definite movement in the Argentine position whereby the sovereignty issue has been deliberately de-linked from the negotiations in the UN. The Argentine Ambassador suggested that it was now for the UK to show flexibility. He went on to insist that Argentina had been observing a ceasefire for some time and claimed that continued British action would jeopardise any chance of a peaceful settlement.

General Walters' Visit to Buenos Aires

9. General Walters telephoned Sir N Henderson on his return to Washington. He was distressed that his remarks in Argentina had caused offence since he was 'a great admirer of the Prime Minister'. His aim was to limit the damage to American relations with Latin America resulting from US support for the UK but he found the Argentine Junta extremely difficult. The State Department subsequently gave the Embassy a more detailed account of the visit. The main points were Galtieri's statement that there were strong anti-American feelings in Argentina as a result of US actions. Galtieri also claimed that the British were spinning-out negotiations indefinitely. He would not, however, seek help from the Soviet Union if the struggle were prolonged. On military questions, members of the Junta accused the US of providing intelligence to the British Task Force. Walters denied this.

G
(Washington
telno.1756)

H
(Washington
telno.1773)

I
(Washington
telno.1762)

US Senate Resolution

10. An attempt by Senator Stevens to table a resolution calling on the British not to attack the Argentine mainland has been averted, as a result of conversations between Sir N Henderson, Judge Clark and Senator Percy.

J
(Washington
telno.1759)

Brazil

11. The State Department report that President Figueiredo now thought that Brazil could no longer play a helpful rôle in the dispute. Both sides were too far apart.

K
(FCO telno.170
to UKMIS Geneva)
L
(MOD telno.
141930Z)

Argentina

12. Following information that the Argentines may be employing the hospital ship 'Bahia Paraiso' to carry food and possibly equipment to troops on the Falkland Islands, the FCO have approached the ICRC to ask whether one of their representatives could remain aboard the vessel and inspect its cargo. MOD have sent instructions to the Task Force on action to be taken should the vessel be sighted within the TEZ.

M
(Caracas
telno.167)

Venezuela

13. To demonstrate its solidarity with Argentina, the Venezuelan Government are sending a mission to European capitals between 15-29 May.

COMMENT

14. Sir A Parsons' game plan seems to have succeeded in winning time over the weekend. Perez de Cuellar emerges in a good light from these latest exchanges. Weekend meetings with EC partners should enable us to judge the effect of Argentine lobbying against a renewal of sanctions, with a chance that this will have proved counter-productive. We will also have an opportunity to discuss the implications of the Venezuelan mission to European capitals in the second half of May.

15. The return of Sir A Parsons and Sir N Henderson to London may encourage credence in Reuters reports of publication of final proposals by the UN Secretary-General within 36 hours. We are ready to correct this impression if necessary.

16. Sir N Henderson will be able to shed light on the background to the President's telephone call to the Prime Minister. Mr Haig continues to give very positive support, but there remains nervousness in Washington about potential damage to US/Latin American relations.

A J Payne

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Emergency Unit

15 May 1982