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OO UKREP BRUSSELS (DESKBY 250600Z)

OO PARIS (DESKBY 250600Z)

OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 250830Z)

OO TOKYO (DESKBY 250130Z)

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25 MAY 1982

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DESKBY UKREP BRUSSELS 250600Z

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DESKBY DUBLIN 250830Z

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
TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 842 OF 24 MAY 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS'S PARTY).

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, DUBLIN, TOKYO.



MY TELS NOS 831 TO 835 AND 839 TO 840: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. THE IRISH TABLED THEIR RESOLUTION IN PROVISIONAL FORM AT 2230Z TODAY (24 MAY). THE TEXT IS AS IN MY TELNO 832, WITH MINOR STYLISTIC CHANGES. THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1400Z TOMORROW (25 MAY).

2. DORR HAD CONSULTED THE NON-ALIGNED THIS AFTERNOON BUT HAD FAILED TO GET A CLEAR STEER FROM THEM (PANAMA WAS SIGNIFICANTLY NOT PRESENT). HE FELT HOWEVER THAT AS HIS TEXT HAD BEEN AROUND ALL DAY HE OUGHT TO TABLE IT FORMALLY. HIS INTENTION IS TO GET IT VOTED UPON BEFORE CLOSE OF PLAY TOMORROW (25 MAY). BUT HE

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RECOGNISED THAT THE SCENARIO MAY CHANGE IF THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO HIS DRAFT OR IF THE PANAMANIAN OR THE JAPANESE PURSUE THEIR OWN DRAFTS: THEIR INTENTIONS ARE NOT AT PRESENT CLEAR. MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD SOME DELEGATIONS (BUT NOT ME) THAT IF THE IRISH DRAFT IS VETTED, HE MIGHT TABLE HIS OWN DRAFT AND SEEK A VOTE ON IT. THE NON-ALIGNED ARE MEETING THIS EVENING. SOME OF THEM WANT TO AVOID A VETO IF THEY POSSIBLY CAN AND THEY MAY COME UP WITH PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO DORR'S DRAFT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE BRAZILIAN DRAFT WILL FLY.

3. THE SITUATION IS THUS CONFUSED. DORR MAY PRESS HIS DRAFT TO A VOTE TOMORROW AFTERNOON (25 MAY) (THOUGH THE TIMETABLE IS COMPLICATED BY THE NEVER-ENDING DEBATE ON THE MERCENARY ATTACK ON THE SEYCHELLES WHICH IS DUE TO RESUME AT 2000Z), ALTHOUGH HE MAY WELL LOSE HIS NERVE IF AMENDMENTS ARE FLYING AROUND. I HAVE LEFT DORR IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST HIS DRAFT. WE HAVE TAKEN THE FRENCH MISSION THROUGH OUR OBJECTIONS TO IT AND URGED THEM TO RECOMMEND TO PARIS THAT THEY TOO SHOULD VOTE AGAINST. THEY HAVE NOT TOLD US WHAT DE NANTEUIL'S RECOMMENDATION WILL BE (THEY PROBABLY DO NOT KNOW) AND THEY ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT WHERE THE AMERICANS STAND.

4. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD URGENTLY FOLLOW-UP PREVIOUS LOBBYING OF THE FRENCH IN ORDER TO PERSUADE THEM TO JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST.

5. I AM REPORTING IN MIFT (FCO, UKREP BRUSSELS, AND WASHINGTON ONLY) ON A CONVERSATION WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK THIS EVENING, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN WASHINGTON.

6. IF WE HAVE TO VETO THE IRISH DRAFT, I WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPLAIN OUR VOTE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. FROM THE BEGINNING WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CEASEFIRE UNLESS THERE WAS CAST-IRON LINKAGE WITH AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A CEASEFIRE WHICH LEFT THE ARGENTINES CONSOLIDATING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE, WE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO USE FORCE TO RE-POSSESS THE ISLANDS. THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD RELIEVE THE CURRENT MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. WE HAD NEGOTIATED FOR SEVEN WEEKS, IN GOOD FAITH, ON VARIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE LINKED A CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIONS WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IN EVERY CASE THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE ARGENTINES.

WOULD CHANGE THE ARGENTINE POSITION. IN ANY CASE, IN THE MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE AREA, A LIMITED SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE.

7. A MORE DIFFICULT DECISION WOULD FACE US IF NISIBORI WERE TO TABLE HIS DRAFT (MY TELNO 835) IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE HAD VETOED THE IRISH ONE. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE ONLY SERIOUSLY OBJECTIONABLE FEATURE IN THE JAPANESE DRAFT IS THE PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PARA 2 "ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS" AS REPORTED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE 2360TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL". THIS COULD BE HELD TO OBLIGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO START FROM WHERE HE WAS ON 20 MAY, IE TO REFLOAT PROPOSALS WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT THEN BUT WHICH HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY OUR LANDINGS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER ABSTAINING: OUR CHOICE SHOULD BE BETWEEN VOTING IN FAVOUR OR VETOING. A VETO OF SUCH A MILD RESOLUTION WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY HERE. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT, IN THE CONTINGENCY DESCRIBED, I SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT BUT MAKE A STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE. THIS WOULD BE ON THE LINES THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD STATED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 20 MAY, OUR PROPOSALS OF 17 MAY WERE NO LONGER ON THE TABLE. OUR SUPPORT OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE INTERPRETED AS NECESSARILY IMPLYING READINESS ON OUR PART TO ACCEPT ANY (ANY) OF THE IDEAS WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE 20 MAY: BUT WE OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULD WISH TO BUILD ON WHAT COULD BE SALVAGED FROM HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS: AND WE WERE ALWAYS READY TO LOOK AT FRESH IDEAS. MEANWHILE WE WOULD NOT FEEL IN ANY WAY INHIBITED FROM CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

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