

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 30 MAY 1982

United Nations

1. According to the Secretary-General the Deputy Argentine Representative told him that our terms for an acceptable ceasefire represented an Argentine surrender; the only point in which Argentina had shown interest was the reference to 'international security arrangements': he had asked whether we were thinking of something under UN auspices or similar to the Sinai HFO. Sir A Parsons undertook to seek clarification. Perez de Cuellar is expecting a UK response to the Argentine terms for a ceasefire on 31 May, whereupon he will presumably have to report failure to the Security Council; he would be grateful to know whether he could at that point make public the text of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's message of 27 May. Sir A Parsons needs instructions by 1400Z on 31 May.

Organisation of American States

2. The OAS meeting adopted on 29 May a harsh Resolution inter alia condemning the UK for its aggression, calling on the US to cease support for the UK, calling on the US, EC and others to lift sanctions and inviting OAS Members to assist Argentina as appropriate.

3. The Resolution was in some ways tougher than the original Argentine draft: Venezuela was apparently assertive during the closed session, the moderating rôle of Mexico and Brazil was less in evidence than before and the US was almost totally defeated. The Embassy comment that the Argentinians might now assume that Latin American support for them is even greater and harden their negotiating position. Haig stood admirably firm during the meeting which challenged the US rôle in the Inter-American system, an issue to which the US Administration have attached high priority.

Haig's Ideas

4. Sir N Henderson saw Secretary of State Haig twice on 29 May. At the first meeting Haig said he was anxious that we should not enter ceasefire or armistice arrangements without indicating that the future could hold something other than humiliation for the Argentinians. Whatever we thought, we should avoid saying that there never could or should be a transfer of sovereignty. Looking to the period after the British retake the Islands, Haig sketched out off-the-cuff a scenario which he developed in his later meeting with Sir N Henderson.

5. Sir N Henderson comments on a number of issues arising from this first meeting. The Americans are concerned at what some of them perceive as a hardening of the British attitude. Sir N Henderson corrected some misconceptions. Haig foresaw that Perez de Cuellar would blame the UK for the failure of his latest mission. Sir N Henderson said this was not our reading of his likely attitude

Haig asked us not to deviate from Security Council Resolution 502: we and the Americans would have a hard time in the Council. In his general anxiety about the effect of the Falklands crisis on relations with Latin America, Haig said his principal current concern was about the impact on Central America and the future of President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative.

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6. At his second meeting with Sir N Henderson Haig explained his tentative ideas in more detail. They envisage the launching of a US/Brazilian initiative (the Brazilians have not been consulted) before the final defeat of Argentine forces on the Island. If we insisted on waiting until after the defeat then any proposals could only come from London. The US/Brazil approach would embrace:-

- (i) general and permanent ceasefire, temporary British military administration, lifting of all sanctions;
- (ii) introduction of US/Brazil peacekeeping force;
- (iii) withdrawal of Argentine forces;
- (iv) creation of UK/US/Brazil/Argentina contact group;
- (v) end of military administration, setting up of local self-government under contact group;
- (vi) withdrawal of British forces;
- (vii) negotiations for definitive settlement of dispute;
- (viii) no prejudicial actions by parties to dispute.

7. Haig also gave his view that restoration of local administration does not include return of a Governor; Britain should not publicly espouse independence or semi-independence as a goal; there should be some agreement on non-reintroduction of forces after withdrawal; and the contact group would stay on indefinitely. Haig hoped we could give him a response to these ideas by 31 May; if it was favourable he would put them to the Argentinians on a take it or leave it basis. He made it clear that he wanted to keep in step with us and would understand if we had doubts or difficulties, but thought that this approach would greatly improve the US and UK position in Latin America even if the Argentinians rejected it.

Peruvian Views

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8. HM Ambassador in Lima reports that President Belaunde is becoming increasingly worried about the implications of the failure of his peace efforts. The Ambassador suggests that we should consider sending a friendly message to the President.

Comment


9. Although no doubt intended to be helpful, Haig's latest proposals present us with some points of difficulty. We shall have to consider urgently what we can give him tomorrow and whether to try to head him off raising some aspects with the Argentines.

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10. At the UN, we seem to be safe from the Security Council today and perhaps until Tuesday. We have to decide whether Perez de Cuellar can make public Mr Pym's message to him of 27 May; and whether to be more forthcoming on 'international security arrangements'.

30 May 1982


R H Jackson
Emergency Unit

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS, 30 MAY

OAS

1. The Rio Treaty meeting accepted a harsh Resolution condemning the UK, calling on the US to cease supporting Britain and inviting Rio Treaty signatories to assist Argentina individually or collectively. Four countries, US, Trinidad, Chile and Colombia, voted against the Resolution.

Military Action

2. The Ministry of Defence announced that 900 Argentine prisoners had been taken at Goose Green. Details of casualties were not given but the death of the Officer Commanding 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, Lt Col Herbert Jones, was announced.

Hospital Ships

3. The Argentine Government warned that unless SS Uganda retreated to a distance which left no doubt as to her activity by the beginning of 29 May, she would be treated as a hostile ship. HMG repeated their assurances that the ship was being used solely as a hospital ship in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention and pointed out that she was rendering assistance to Argentine as well as British casualties.

30 May 1982

Emergency Unit