**319.** Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>

New York, June 3, 1982, 0549Z

1550. Dept for Deputy Secretary Stoessel, AS Enders, White House National Security Advisor Clark, CIA for Casey from Ambassador

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820288–0201. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London.

Kirkpatrick. Subject: Falklands: Amb Kirkpatrick's Meeting With Generals. Ref: USUN 1549.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text)

2. At the Argentinians' request, Generals Jose Miret and Miguel Mallea Gil met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano.

3. Miret began with Argentinian version of recent military events in the South Atlantic. Both sides had inflicted damage and suffered casualties but the British continued their skillful manipulation of military reports. Miret challenged British figures indicating that sixty Argentinian aircraft had been destroyed. Half that number was more accurate. Miret also dismissed British denials of damage to the carrier Invincible. Finally, while acknowledging that British forces were closing around Port Stanley, Miret asserted that British success would not come easily.

4. Miret continued by outlining a four point proposal which included: A) immediate ceasefire, B) mutual withdrawal, C) creation of a four-nation UN administration for the islands, and D) negotiations with a specified time-limit. This proposal, if accepted, would prevent the continuing degeneration of the situation. Even if Argentinian forces were defeated in the Falklands, this would be but the initial chapter of a very long story. Argentina would have lost the battle but not the war and it would continue to fight from the mainland. In turn the UK would have to fortify the Islands and to defend them would have to attack Argentinian forces at their bases in the mainland. This would precipitate a Hemispheric confrontation with Britain which would surely destroy the interAmerican system. The US should, therefore, urge the UK to accept the proposal.

5. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that the same proposal had already been presented to, and rejected by, the UK. At the request of AS Enders she had personally conveyed this information last week to Amb Takacs in Washington.<sup>3</sup> Events had overtaken that proposal and attention was now focused on two new proposals before the UN Security Council. The first proposal—being moved by Spain—simply called for a cease fire. (Reftel) It would be voted on tomorrow (June 3) and the British had indicated that they would veto it. The second proposal had not yet surfaced. It was a British text mentioning Resolutions 502 and 505

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In telegram 1549 from USUN, June 3, the Mission reported Spain's submission to the Security Council of a draft resolution, co-sponsored by Panama, calling on the parties to "observe an immediate cessation of hostilities, authorize the SYG to use his offices to secure the ceasefire, and request that he report back to the Council within 72 hours." The Mission added that the Spanish Permanent Representative, de Pinies, "told UK Amb Parsons, in the presence of Amb Kirkpatrick, that his purpose is to provide an appropriate 'fig-leaf' that would permit Argentina to take the decision to withdraw its forces from Port Stanley." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820287–1083)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Document 316.

and proposing a ceasefire once Argentina indicated its willingness to withdraw its forces from the Falklands within fourteen days. (Reftel)

6. Both Miret and Mallea coincided in regarding the British proposal as a totally unacceptable ultimatum.<sup>4</sup> Miret claimed that if Argentinian troops were withdrawn from the Falklands under those terms they would march on Buenos Aires to depose the government upon their return to the mainland. Mallea added that it was not a question of just being unacceptable to the government but that the Argentinian people as a whole would also reject it. They both concurred that it would be preferable to fight and lose than to accept those terms. In their estimation being defeated after a valiant fight at least had the advantage that it would unify the Argentines. But a dishonorable surrender would tear the nation apart.

7. The Spanish proposal, on the other hand, was entirely acceptable to Argentina. In their view, however, Britain would veto it. They also believed that France would vote for it and that Japan would follow the US lead. Their only question was how the US would vote. They hoped the US would support it or, at least, abstain. An American veto would send an unmistakeable signal that the US had totally sided with Britain against Argentina. The Spanish resolution only called for a ceasefire and a US vote against it could only be interpreted as a US desire to see the war continued to its ultimate consequences. While US-Argentine relations are currently strained there is still the possibility of repairing the damage. That damage would be exceedingly, perhaps even impossibly, difficult to repair if the US voted against the Spanish resolution.

8. Amb Kirkpatrick responded that she understood their views but that she supposed that the US would vote against the Spanish resolution. Nevertheless, she would immediately convey their views to Washington. She knew that US relations with Argentina have been stormy and that there have been periods (such as the one characterized by the chant "O Braden O Peron") that could only be charcterized as antagonistic. Perhaps we are now entering one of those unfortunate periods.

9. The meeting concluded with Miret forcefully reiterating that an American veto would damage US-Argentinian relations to a much deeper extent than even the worst periods in the past.

10. Comment: SYG Perez de Cuellar has informed Amb Kirkpatrick that Argentinian Foreign Ministry is thinking of a UNSC veto with a subsequent call for an emergency session of the GA. She believes that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Presumbably the May 17 proposal. See Document 271.

## conversation with Miret and Mellea was pro-forma perhaps because they also favor such a scenario.

