

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060445Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 944 OF 6 JUNE
AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

DIST: 1
We refer. Agree reasons.
ref.

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLANDS:

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. AN IDENTICAL MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO GALTIERI.
2. THE S-G IS NOT WELL AND DE SOTO DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO ME LATE TONIGHT (SATURDAY). I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE S-G HAD ANY INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION: I KNEW THAT THEY HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY. DE SOTO SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT: ALL HE COULD TELL ME WAS THAT THE S-G WAS MAKING SURE THAT HIS MESSAGE "GOT TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE".
3. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ANOTHER GENUINE LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED. OBVIOUSLY IT HAS COME TOO LATE, WHILE POINTS 4-7 WOULD DRAW US BACK INTO THE MORASS FROM WHICH WE EMERGED ON 20 MAY.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM THE P.M. TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR BY 8PM NEW YORK TIME ON SUNDAY. THIS MESSAGE MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
 - (A) APPRECIATE OF THE S-G'S, CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
 - (B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE: TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE:
 - (C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE FOUND IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE (HAVANA TELS NO'S 3 AND 4 TO ME).
 - (D) IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THE SG'S PROGRAMME FOR A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT WORK: ONLY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS WOULD ACHIEVE THIS NOW (POINTS 1 AND 2):
 - (E) WE WILL NOT COMMIT OURSELVES NOW, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO A PROGRAMME FOR A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES "IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", OR TO FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UN AUSPICES (POINT 4). WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS TO BE PREJUDICED.
 - (F) EQUALLY WE WILL NOT NOW COMMIT OURSELVES TO A PROGRAMME OF NEGOTIATIONS (POINTS 5-7) UNDER UN AUSPICES, ESPECIALLY "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY": OUR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSITION IS INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY THE NAM COMMUNIQUE AND BY OUR EXPERIENCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONCLUDED ON 20 MAY.
 - (G) HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SG'S PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE TO SUCH A FAR REACHING SET OF PROPOSITIONS "AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE". WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO ANOTHER PROBABLY LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINE FORCES STILL SITTING ON THE ISLANDS. OUR FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SECURE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
5. IT IS NOT INCONVEIVABLE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS "AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE" FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS THAT THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US I.E. THAT THEY COULD THEN PRESS FOR A CEASEFIRE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON POINTS 4-7. EQUALLY, IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS REVEALED HIS IDEAS TO THE AMERICANS, THEY MAY TRY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO ACCEPT.

PARSONS

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