333. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations (Clarey)¹

Ser 00/MFR-092

Washington, June 11, 1982

SUBJ

CNO Meeting with Argentine Officials on Friday, 11 June 1982

- 1. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward met with Argentine Ambassador Esteban A. Takacs, Air Attache BGEN Pena, and the DATT/Naval Attache VADM Franco at 0930 on Friday, 11 June 1982.² The meeting had been suggested by former Secretary of the Navy Hidalgo and was encouraged by ASSTSECSTATE Enders during discussions with Admiral Hayward Thursday evening, 10 June 1982.³
- 2. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward explained that historically military relations between the U.S. and Argentina have been maintained despite the periodic ups and downs of our political relationships. He, like the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has a great interest in ensuring that these communications channels continued to function, especially during crisis situations when relations are strained, and that our long-term relationships, after the Falklands situation was resolved, were very important to both countries. He welcomed the opportunity for this meeting in order to gain a better perspective on the Argentine views of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis.
- 3. (S/NF) Ambassador Takacs noted that he and ASSTSECSTATE Enders had discussed opportunities for such an exchange of views and he was pleased to meet with the CNO. As recently as ten days ago he had been optimistic about the possibilities for a negotiated settlement. However, over the past few days, he saw the Argentine and British positions diverging, and he was particularly concerned at the current lack of diplomatic activity.
- 4. (S/NF) The Ambassador stated that the British were misrepresenting the military situation in the Malvinas and were predicting a quick military victory. This misrepresentation had removed the pres-

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982. Secret; Noforn. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on June 14. Copies were sent to Jones, Carlucci, Enders, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. A notation in an unknown hand reads "Hand carried."

² Takacs, Peña, and Franco also had a similar discussion regarding the military situation in the South Atlantic with Burkhalter on June 11. The record of this conversation, produced by Burkhalter, is ibid.

³ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

sure for continued negotiations. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have an appreciation for the true military situation in the Malvinas and hoped that the United States would do all in its power to help force a diplomatic resolution. The Argentine position is that the conflict cannot be resolved on military terms and the political consequences of a long-term conflict would be very damaging for all three countries. The Argentines hope that negotiations can resume very quickly in order to end a war that has caused many casualties and is more "stupid than either country ever could have envisioned."

- 5. (S/NF) Admiral Hayward asked if the U.S. should resume the role of mediator or would a third party or the United Nations be a better vehicle to encourage continued negotiations. Ambassador Takacs replied that without strong U.S. encouragement, the U.N. was impotent in this situation. Perez de Cuellar had no leverage with either Argentina or the U.K. and thus was ineffective. The U.S. alone has that leverage. Ideally, the U.S. would disassociate itself politically from the U.K. in terms of supporting a continued military conflict. Many European countries were currently doing this. Without political support, the U.K. could not continue its military operations and would be forced to negotiate.
- 6. (S/NF) BGEN Pena presented the Argentine military's view of U.K. military casualties and Argentine air operations to date. He reviewed ship and aircraft losses during the major engagements on 1 May, 24-25 May, and 8 June. He reported that 442 Argentine Air Force sorties had been flown through the 6th of June, 225 of which were anti-shipping missions, 85 of which were air-to-ground missions. British losses during these engagements were much more severe than had been reported,⁴ particularly during the 8 June engagement. Concerning the loss of Argentine aircraft, he indicated that approximately 25% of their Air Force had been destroyed, not the 60% reported by the British. Many of their pilots had been rescued, and their Air Force would be able to continue its operations in equipment being obtained from other countries. He opined that the overstated air losses were part of the British efforts to create the impression that a military victory was near at hand. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have a different perspective so that he would understand that such a victory was not imminent and that the Argentines were both prepared to fight and could fight for a long period of time. He pointed out that the British already were being pushed back from the Port Stanley area and that

⁴ In the conversation with Burkhalter, Peña specified that the Argentine Air Force had "sunk six British destroyers; six frigates; and damaged several other ships, including both the HERMES and INVINCIBLE," the two British aircraft carriers. (See footnote 2 above.)

the Argentines had retaken Mount Kent. Thirty C-130 resupply missions had been flown into Port Stanley last week.

- 7. (U) Admiral Hayward commented that throughout all of his studies of military conflicts, including World War II and his own experiences in Korea and Vietnam, that damage reports were always overstated by both sides. He said it was important for both Argentina and the U.K. to avoid a miscalculation based on self-serving over-optimistic estimates of damage.
- 8. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador Takacs commented that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to present the Argentine views on the conflict and stressed the importance of U.S. assistance in the resumption of negotiations. Admiral Hayward indicated that he would relate the Argentine concerns over the misrepresentation of the military situation in the Falklands, their desire that negotiations be revitalized as quickly as possible, and that the U.S. was being asked to play a key role in this effort.

S.S. Clarey
Captain, U.S. Navy
Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations