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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1045 OF 23 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

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FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK: CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. AFTER A VERY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE LEBANON, THE REMAINDER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS DEVOTED TO THE FALKLANDS.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD A MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE REALISED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING MUCH TO BE DONE AT PRESENT, BUT HE MIGHT GET QUERIES FROM COUNCIL MEMBERS ABOUT WHAT IF ANYTHING HE WAS DOING.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WE WERE FACING ON THE ISLANDS. WE HAD REPATRIATED ABOUT 10,000 ARGENTINE PRISONERS, A NUMBER OF WHOM HAD BEEN IN POOR CONDITION. WE WOULD KEEP ABOUT 600 TO 700 TECHNICIANS, PILOTS AND SENIOR OFFICERS PENDING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. 35 ARGENTINIANS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO CLEAR MINES. THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM OVER UNMARKED PLASTIC MINEFIELDS. THEY WOULD BE A DANGER FOR MANY YEARS. FOUR BRITISH SOLDIERS HAD ALREADY BEEN INJURED WHILE LIFTING MINES.
4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND 11

4. AS REGARDS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES ETC, WE HAD SENT A MESSAGE VIA THE SWISS BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH. THE PRIME MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 10 AND 11 OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE (MY TELNO 1032). SHE MENTIONED THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ISLANDERS UNDER OCCUPATION AND THAT MR HUNT WAS RETURNING TO THE ISLANDS WITH 100 ISLANDERS. HE WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE ISLANDERS AND WOULD GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE. HE WOULD BE A CIVIL COMMISSIONER WHILE GENERAL MOORE WOULD DEAL WITH MILITARY MATTERS. THE PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL RECONSTRUCTION WERE ENORMOUS AND WOULD TAKE MONTHS. WE HAD TO TAKE IT GENTLY.

5. WE WERE RETURNING ABOUT 3,000 BRITISH TROOPS TO THE UK ON THE CANBERRA, BUT WOULD BE BRINGING OUT ENGINEERS TO REBUILD THE AIR FIELD AND EXTEND THE RUNWAY. THESE AND OTHER PRACTICALITIES WOULD ABSORB OUR ATTENTION FOR SOMETIME. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

6. IF THERE WERE NO HOSTILITIES FOR A LONGISH PERIOD, WE MIGHT ASSUME THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR MESSAGE, AND RETURN THE REMAINING PRISONERS.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT WE MUST RESTORE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STAGE.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER REITERATED THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE COULD BUILD ON THAT LATER. AT PRESENT, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO WE WERE DEALING WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THIS MIGHT REMAIN THE CASE FOR A LONG PERIOD.

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT, IF THERE WAS NO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THERE WOULD BE A PERMANENT FOCUS OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BOTH AS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AS A SOUTH AMERICAN, HE FELT THAT SOME DIALOGUE MUST BE RESUMED AT SOME STAGE.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE DID NOT FEEL THAT WE HAD LOST FRIENDSHIP THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. IT MIGHT BE IN ABEYANCE IN SOME COUNTRIES FOR THE MOMENT. SHE MENTIONED THE VENEZUELA/GUYANA DISPUTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH VENEZUELA WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PROMISED HIM THAT THEY WOULD NEVER USE FORCE. VENEZUELA HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SEND A MISSION TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

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11. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS AT OUR DISPOSAL AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ARGENTINES WHO TRUSTED HIM. HE REALISED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. HOWEVER, WE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS MANDATE AT A LATER STAGE: NO FRESH UN INITIATIVE WOULD BE REQUIRED.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS AND OUR INTENTION TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER.

13. AFTER THE MEETING, DE SOTO GAVE GOULDING A PIECE OF PAPER (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.) REPRESENTING POINTS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MEANT TO MAKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IT DID NOT NEED ANY RESPONSE FROM US AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PUTTING PRESSURE ON US NOR OF SETTING NEW DEADLINES FOR A RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD NOT DECIDED WHEN HE WOULD NEED REPORT AGAIN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: IT DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

14. THIS MEETING WENT WELL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE NOT IN THE MOOD TO BE SUCKED INTO ANOTHER NEGOTIATION AND, BY MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE IN THE DISCUSSION, SHE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEVELOP ALL THE POINTS IN HIS SPEAKING NOTE. ON THE OTHER HAND HE HAD JUST ENOUGH OF THE BATTING TO FEEL THAT HIS HONOUR WAS SATISFIED. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO DEALT EFFECTIVELY WITH THE QUESTIONS ABOUT FUTURE UN INVOLVEMENT AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE. HAPPILY, MY COUNCIL COLLEAGUES ARE SHOWING NO SIGN OF INTEREST IN RESUSCITATING THE SUBJECT. I RAKED DORR (IRELAND) AND OTHERS WITH FIRE A FEW DAYS AGO. OTTUNU (UGANDA) ANTICIPATED ME BY SAYING THAT HE IMAGINED THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD LYNCH ANYONE WHO TALKED OF NEGOTIATING WITH ARGENTINA FOR AT LEAST A YEAR.

PARSONS

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