

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (42)

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/LORD BELSTEAD

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

~~SIR I SINCLAIR~~ *R. ALLEN*

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

MR BARRETT

HD/S AM D

HD/FALKLANDS UNIT (2)

HD/DEF DEPT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/ERD

HD/PUSD (2)

MR REED, PUSD

EMERGENCY ROOM

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/No 10 Dst)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )

PS/SIR M PALLISER )

PS/SIR A DUFF )

MR A D S GOODALL )

~~MR FULLER~~ )

MR COLVIN )

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS- )

MENTS STAFF )

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 021808Z JULY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1082 OF 2 JULY,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

FALKLANDS:

1. THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS MY LAST THOUGHTS FROM HERE ON THIS SUBJECT.
2. I SEE TWO PROBLEMS AHEAD. FIRST, WE MAY BE FACED WITH A RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT WE SHOULD OPEN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 3 OF SCR 502) AND BRING ABOUT A FORMAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1), ALL THIS TO BE NEGOTIATED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER THE MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM IN SCR 505.
3. THERE IS NO SIGN AT PRESENT OF THE ARGENTINES (OR PANAMANIAN/SPANISH) WISHING TO PRECIPITATE SUCH A MOVE. I HAVE MADE IT WIDELY KNOWN TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND TO NON-MEMBERS THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF OUR RESUMING DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THERE HAS BEEN A COOLING OFF PERIOD OF MANY MONTHS. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION TO DO ON THE ISLANDS BEFORE WE CAN EVEN

OF MANY MONTHS. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION TO DO ON THE ISLANDS BEFORE WE CAN EVEN PROPERLY CONSULT THE ISLANDERS. EQUALLY, BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD FIND ANY NEGOTIATION BETWEEN US AND ARGENTINA AT THIS STAGE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, ARGENTINA ITSELF NEEDS TO SETTLE DOWN AFTER THE PRESENT INTERNAL CONVULSIONS HAVE TAKEN THEIR COURSE. NO ONE HAS CONTESTED THIS VIEW. INDEED, OTUNNU (UGANDA), WHO IS AT PRESENT THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, SAYS HE TOLD LISTRE (ARGENTINA) A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE COUNCIL BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM FOR AT LEAST NINE MONTHS. EVEN THEN IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE PARTIES GOT TOGETHER BILATERALLY AND ONLY BROUGHT THE QUESTION TO THE COUNCIL IF BOTH AGREED TO DO SO. LISTRE DID NOT APPARENTLY DEMUR.

4. I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT DANGER LIES WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT HIS MANDATE IS STILL IN BEING, AND HE MAY AT SOME STAGE FEEL OBLIGED TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. THIS WOULD AT THE LEAST LEAD TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. I DOUBT HOWEVER WHETHER HE WILL MAKE ANY MOVE UNTIL AFTER HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 13/14 JULY. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT, ON THAT OCCASION, THE SITUATION SHOULD BE THRASHED OUT COMPREHENSIVELY WITH HIM, AND THAT HE SHOULD BE LEFT IN ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT AS TO OUR POSITION. HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR HIM TO MAKE A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAS MADE NO SUCH REPORT REGARDING OLOF PALME'S MISSION TO IRAN/IRAQ AND HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED BY ANYONE IN THE COUNCIL ON THIS ACCOUNT. HE SHOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT ANY ACTION BY HIM DURING THE COOLING OFF PERIOD WOULD BE BOTH EMBARRASSING AND UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO HESITATION IN OPPOSING ANY MOVE IN THE COUNCIL HOWEVER WELL MEANT AND APPARENTLY INNOCUOUS.

5. I BELIEVE THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL RESPOND TO SUCH AN APPROACH. HE IS BASICALLY SYMPATHETIC TO US OVER THE FALKLANDS. HE WILL CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO FALL FOUL OF THE UK SO EARLY IN THIS SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP. BUT, DE SOTO, ALTHOUGH NOT ANTI-BRITISH, REMAINS KEEN TO GET THE UN BACK INTO THE ACT. OUR MESSAGE SHOULD BE SPELT OUT VERY FIRMLY TO HIM TOO IN LONDON.

6. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PRECEDED PERHAPS BY ACTION EITHER IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24 (IN AUGUST) AND/OR AT THE NAM SUMMIT (IF IT TAKES PLACE). WE ALREADY KNOW THAT THE MEXICANS ARE ACTIVE AND, WHATEVER EXACT ROUTE THEY CHOOSE, WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FACED AT SOME STAGE IN THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH A RESOLUTION RE-AFFIRMING PAST GA RESOLUTIONS MENTIONING NAM LANGUAGE ON THE QUESTION, AND CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THEY SHOULD LEAD TO A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, PROBABLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE 'INTERESTS' OF THE ISLANDERS. THE RESOLUTION WOULD

THAT THEY SHOULD LEAD TO A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, PROBABLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE 'INTERESTS' OF THE ISLANDERS. THE RESOLUTION WOULD EMBRACE THE FALKLANDS AND THE DEPENDENCIES.

WE SHOULD NOT RESIGN OURSELVES TO THIS PROSPECT. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN REMISS IN THE PAST ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE SAT BACK AND DONE NOTHING ABOUT THE REGULAR REPETITION OF LANGUAGE ABOUT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT SUCCESSIVE NAM SUMMITS STARTING WITH LIMA 1976. ONLY A HANDFUL OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES, INCLUDING ARGENTINA, ARE FULL MEMBERS OF THE NAM AND THIS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN REGULARLY FOISTED ON THE MOVEMENT BY THIS TINY MINORITY. WE SHOULD HAVE MOBILISED THE COMMONWEALTH TO RESIST THIS. WE HAVE HAD CHOGM LANGUAGE IN THE PAST ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO SMALL TERRITORIES - BELIZE, CYPRUS, GUYANA - AND WE SHOULD HAVE PRESSED FOR APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE ON THE FALKLANDS IN ORDER TO DERAIL THE LATIN AMERICAN TRAIN IN THE NAM.

8. IT HAS NOW BECOME DIFFICULT TO RECTIFY THIS SITUATION, SINCE SUCCESSIVE NAM PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT HAVE ACQUIRED SOMETHING OF THE NATURE OF HOLY WRIT. BUT WE SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT AND THE COMMONWEALTH (WHICH COMPRISES A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE NAM MEMBERSHIP) IS THE BEST FORUM IN WHICH TO ACT. I HOPE THAT VERY EARLY ACTION CAN BE TAKEN (AS RECOMMENDED IN GOULDING'S LETTER F025/1 OF 16 JUNE TO WILLIAMS) TO TRY TO GET A COUNTER-TEXT OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH. IF THE NAM SUMMIT TAKES PLACE, WE SHOULD MOUNT A MAJOR OPERATION A FEW WEEKS BEFOREHAND BOTH THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT IN LONDON AND IN COMMONWEALTH CAPITALS TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE CARIBBEANS, AFRICANS, ASIANS AND PACIFICS NOT TO BE RAIL-ROADED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS INTO BLINDLY ACCEPTING ARGENTINA'S CLAIM, AND TO CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS. IN THE HAPPY EVENT OF THE NAM SUMMIT NOT TAKING PLACE IN SEPTEMBER, WE SHOULD MOUNT A SIMILAR OPERATION IN ADVANCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION WHICH OPENS HERE ON 21 SEPTEMBER. IT WOULD BE BEST TO START THE LOBBYING IN LONDON AND CAPITALS AS I HAVE SUGGESTED ABOVE. WE WOULD THEN FOLLOW UP HERE WITH DELEGATIONS AS AND WHEN THE RESOLUTION STARTED TO TAKE SHAPE.

9. IF WE WORKED HARD ENOUGH, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FRIGHTEN THE LATIN AMERICANS INTO THINKING THAT THEY WOULD GET A VERY POOR POSITIVE VOTE FOR THEIR PROPOSITIONS WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM PAUSE.

10. OUR SECOND MISTAKE FROM THE UN STAND POINT HAS BEEN TO LINK THE FALKLANDS WITH SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS IN SOME OF OUR PERIODIC LETTERS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTING ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS, THE LATEST EXAMPLE HAVING BEEN SENT IN JUNE 1979 (A/34/343). THIS IS A HOOK FROM WHICH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DETACH OURSELVES. FROM NOW ON, I THINK THAT WE WOULD DO BEST TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH

*Are we taking action if not we should do so No.*

~~TO DETACH OURSELVES. FROM NOW ON, I THINK THAT WE WOULD DO BEST TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA CHANGED EVERYTHING, THAT WE HAD ONLY LINKED THE VARIOUS ISLANDS PREVIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS AND THE DEPENDENCIES AND THAT WE REGARD THE THREE QUESTIONS IN SUBSTANCE AS BEING UTTERLY SEPARATE. THIS PROBLEM WILL RETURN TO HAUNT US HERE AND WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO BRAZEN IT OUT. WE CAN ALSO ARGUE THAT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS DO NOT IN UN TERMS INVOLVE COLONIAL ISSUES BECAUSE THEY ARE UNINHABITED: IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW ART. 73 OR RES. 1514 APPLY, OR HOW THE COMMITTEE OF 24 HAS A MANDATE TO CONSIDER THE DEPENDENCIES.~~

11. TO SUM UP, I AM NOT TOO WORRIED ABOUT THE COMMITTEE OF 24. ALTHOUGH IT PULLULATES WITH NASTIES, IT IS BASICALLY ALL ABOUT ARTICLE 73 AND SELF-DETERMINATION AND IS NOT THEREFORE THE BEST OF ARENAS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO CHOOSE. IT IS EQUALLY A COMPARATIVELY UNIMPORTANT BODY. THE NAM SUMMIT AND THE ASSEMBLY ITSELF ARE WHERE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR FIRE.

12. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM AGAIN WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR AT MY FAREWELL CALL ON HIM. HE TOLD ME THAT LISTRE (ARGENTINA) HAD BEEN RECALLED TO BUENOS AIRES FOR CONSULTATIONS. THIS MIGHT LEAD TO SOME COMMUNICATION TO HIM, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON. HE ALSO MENTIONED A RUMOUR WHICH I HAD NOT HEARD THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT BE THINKING OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO TWO LEADING LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS TO KILL THIS IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN IT. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO ME, AND THAT THE RUMOUR WAS PROBABLY BASED ON THE UNHELPFUL MEXICAN ACTIVITY IN RELATION TO THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

13. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED TENTATIVELY ABOUT OUR POSITION. I SAID FIRMLY THAT WE MUST BE LEFT ALONE FOR A LONG TIME. NO FRESH INITIATIVE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY NEGOTIATION BETWEEN US AND ARGENTINA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WONDERED WHETHER THINGS WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN THREE MONTHS, I.E. BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I SAID FIRMLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT, AND TOLD HIM THAT OUR WHOLE POSITION WOULD BE SET OUT TO HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON.

PARSONS

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