

GRS 1385
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 270700Z
FM MOSCOW 262057Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1223 OF 26 OCT
AND TO FLASH PARIS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
FLASH OTTAWA (FOR PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY)
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER NATO POSTS
INFO PRIORITY SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN,
WARSAW, PRAGUE, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, UKMIS NEW YORK

INF : ANDROPOV INTERVIEW WITH PRAVDA

1. ENGLISH TASS THIS EVENING, 26 OCTOBER, CARRIED THE TEXT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH ANDROPOV TO BE PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 27 OCTOBER.

2. MAIN POINTS:

(A) ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION AT THE GENEVA TALKS, ANDROPOV SAID THAT THE IMPASSE THERE CONTINUED. ONLY BLOC LOYALTY PREVENTED EVEN THE MOST DEVOTED ALLIES OF THE US FROM ADMITTING THE REASON OPENLY. SOVIET PROPOSALS OVER THE TWO YEARS OF TALKS CONTAINED ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD THAT DID NOT DAMAGE ANYONE'S INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF RECENT US STATEMENTS AND WHAT WAS BEING SAID BY THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA. IT TRANSPIRED THAT US FLEXIBILITY DID NOT GO FURTHER THAN WORDS. THE ESSENCE OF THE US LINE, TO ENSURE A CONSIDERABLE US SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR BY DEPLOYING NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE, REMAINED UNCHANGED. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO COUNT ON PROGRESS AT THE TALKS SO LONG AS THE US KEPT TO ITS UNREALISTIC AND LOPSIDED POSITION.

(B) ASKED IF ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED, ANDROPOV SAID THAT THIS DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON THE US. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT GIVING UP THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCORD UNTIL THE US MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE BY ITS ACTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY WHILE OBSERVING ONE IMPERATIVE REQUIREMENT: THE BALANCE OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE MUST NOT BE DISRUPTED. THE LEVEL OF THESE ARMS ON BOTH SIDES COULD AND MUST BE RADICALLY LOWERED BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAVE THE RATIO OF FORCES BETWEEN THEM UNCHANGED. THIS MEANT THAT (I) NEW AMERICAN MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE BECAUSE THIS WOULD SHARPLY CHANGE THE ENTIRE MILITARY STRATEGIC SITUATION BY NATO'S ADVANTAGE, AND (II) ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN ON BOTH SIDES OF ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE CORRESPONDING RANGE WITHOUT ANY EXCLUSIONS WHATSOEVER. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RETREAT FROM THIS JUST DEMAND. BUT WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK IT WAS DISPLAYING FLEXIBILITY AND CONSTRUCTIVENESS. ANDROPOV SAID HE COULD NOW SPEAK OF SOME ADDITIONAL SOVIET STEPS.

(C) THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE TO SIMILAR LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES OF BOTH DELIVERY VEHICLES (MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT) AND WARHEADS. SOME PEOPLE HAD ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO IF, IN ORDER TO ENSURE EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE USSR ON ONE SIDE AND THE UK AND FRANCE ON THE OTHER, IT WAS COMPELLED TO HAVE A SMALLER NUMBER OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS THAN NATO ALREADY POSSESSED. HAVING IN MIND THE PRESENT NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES, THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO HAVE IN EUROPE 'ABOUT 140 SS-20 LAUNCHERS' WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY LESS THAN THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHERS POSSESSED BY THE UK AND FRANCE.

(D) IT HAD BEEN ASKED WHETHER, FOLLOWING ITS STATED READINESS TO LIQUIDATE INSTEAD OF REDEPLOYING ALL MISSILES TO BE REDUCED IN ITS EUROPEAN ZONE IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT AT GENEVA, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD IN PARALLEL TO THE LIQUIDATION OF MISSILES IN ITS EUROPEAN PARTS BUILD UP SUCH MISSILES IN ITS EASTERN AREAS, WHICH COULD THEN BE MOVED FROM THE EAST TO THE WEST. ANDROPOV SAID THAT TO REMOVE ALL DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE HE COULD EXPLICITLY SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES FROM EAST TO WEST AND IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT BEING REACHED AT GENEVA AND ENTERING INTO FORCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO PUT AN END TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS20 MISSILES IN ITS EASTERN AREAS, AND WOULD FIRMLY PROCEED ON THIS BASIS ON CONDITION THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OCCURRED IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE ASIAN REGION. THIS MEANT PRIMARILY THAT THE US SHOULD NOT DEPLOY NEW MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AREAS FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH THE EASTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.

(E) IT WAS SOMETIMES SAID THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE RETENTION, AFTER REDUCTIONS, OF NOT MORE THAN 300 MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES EXCESSIVELY UNDERCUT THE AMERICAN AVIATION SYSTEMS OF CORRESPONDING RANGE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO AIM TO IMPINGE ON THE UNITED STATES ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE PLANES WERE NOT BASED IN OTHER COUNTRIES FROM WHERE THEY COULD REACH US TERRITORY. BUT HERE TOO THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO SHOW ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY: TO ESTABLISH FOR THE USSR AND NATO EQUAL TOTAL LEVELS OF MEDIUM RANGE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE QUANTITATIVE RANGE, EVEN THOUGH THIS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERRED FROM THE EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE CONCRETE TOTALS OF THESE LEVELS COULD BE AGREED UPON JUST AS THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT SUBJECT TO LIMITATION COULD BE SPECIFIED.

(F) ANDROPOV WAS ASKED ABOUT THE SUGGESTION IN THE WEST THAT IN ORDER TO DISPLAY GOODWILL, THE SOVIET UNION COULD EVEN NOW CARRY OUT A UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ITS MISSILES IN EUROPE. ANDROPOV REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF UNILATERAL STEPS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE WITH THE AIM OF CREATING THE MAXIMUM FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESS AT THE TALKS. THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN ITS EUROPEAN PART, ANNOUNCED A YEAR AND A HALF AGO,

WAS BEING UNDEVIATINGLY OBSERVED. THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES BEYOND THE URALS IN AREAS FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ALSO BEEN STOPPED. MOREOVER, BY NOW ALL THE SS5 MISSILES WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEPLOYED 'IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE' AND WHICH HAD A NO LESSER RANGE THAN THE SS20S WHILE EXCEEDING THEM GREATLY IN WARHEAD YIELD, HAD BEEN PHASED OUT. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE US AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD SURELY BE WELL INFORMED OF THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS ON THIS SCORE BUT THEY WERE CONCEALING THE TRUTH FROM THEIR PEOPLES. THERE WERE NO SIGNS AT ALL THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF ITS CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED FURTHER TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY ITS MISSILES. ON THE CONTRARY EVERYTHING POINTED TO THE OPPOSITE. FOR THIS REASON THE SOVIET UNION NATURALLY COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT RISK ITS SECURITY AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES.

(G) IF HOWEVER THE US RENOUNCED THE DEPLOYMENT OF ITS MISSILES IN EUROPE WITHIN THE ANNOUNCED DEADLINES AND THEREBY PROVIDED A POSSIBILITY FOR CONTINUING THE TALKS AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS THEN THE SOVIET UNION COULD COMMENCE 'ALREADY NOW' THE REDUCTION OF ITS SS4 MISSILES, OF WHICH IT HAD OVER 200, AND COMPLETE THEIR LIQUIDATION IN THE COURSE OF 1984 TO 1985. AND IF IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE A JUST AGREEMENT IN GENEVA THEN A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE PRESENTLY EXISTING SS20 MISSILES WOULD NATURALLY ALSO BE LIQUIDATED.

(H) FINALLY, ANDROPOV WAS ASKED ABOUT STATEMENTS BEING MADE IN WESTERN CAPITALS THAT WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN MISSILES THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD SUPPOSEDLY GAIN A NEW IMPULSE AND BECOME MORE PRODUCTIVE. ANDROPOV SAID THAT THIS WAS AN UTTER DECEPTION DESIGNED TO DAMP THE INTENSITY OF THE STRUGGLE BY WEST EUROPEAN PEOPLES AGAINST INF DEPLOYMENT. HE THEN CONTINUED: 'EVERYTHING MUST BE TOTALLY CLEAR HERE: THE APPEARANCE OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL MAKE A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT TALKS IN GENEVA IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GENEVA TALKS CAN BE CONTINUED IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT START THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES'.

3. THE TEXT ENDED AT THIS POINT. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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