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MR COLES NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ ST

MR BLELLOCH DUS(P) MOD

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cc New
Delhi

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PP-TOKYO

GR 740

SECRET

FROM UKDEL NATO 251433Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 293 OF 25 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BONN BRUSSELS PARIS ROME MOSCOW

MODUK (DS17) PRIORITY ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE

LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK MADRID UKDEL VIENNA TOKYO

INF BRIEFING OF NAC BY AMBASSADOR NITZE

1. AMBASSADOR NITZE BRIEFED THE NAC THIS MORNING ON THE SIXTH ROUND OF INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE FULL TEXT OF THE FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23 BY KVITSINSKY FOLLOWS IN M I F T.
2. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE HIS PREVIOUS APPEARANCE BEFORE THE NAC ON OCTOBER 14. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG). IN PARTICULAR, HE REFERRED TO THE PRIVATE MEETINGS HE

IMMEDIATE

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HAD HELD WITH AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE ROUND IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY ROUND THE OBSTACLES SEPARATING THE TWO SIDES IN GENEVA, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWING HIM TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE AREAS OF AGREEMENT. THREE TOPICS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY:

A) THE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE:

B) SOVIET REFERENCES TO AN APPROACH THAT WOULD RESULT IN 54 SS20S-V-ZERO US DEPLOYMENT:

AND

C) THE POSSIBILITY RAISED BY KVITSINSKY IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION ON OCTOBER 26 OF REACHING AGREEMENT VIA EQUAL REDUCTIONS.

3. ON THE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE, AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY HAD STATED THAT IF ANY ON THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT THE PACKAGE MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATION THEY WERE SPEAKING OUT OF TURN AND THAT IF PROPOSED, MOSCOW WOULD REJECT THE PACKAGE IN ITS ENTIRETY. AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKY ALSO STATED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD THINK OF ACCEPTING A NUMBER OF SS20S AS LOW AS 54: THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD NOT AGREE. (IN DISCUSSION NITZE ADDED THAT NO NUMBER BELOW 120 HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE SOVIETS, NOR HAD THE RUSSIANS BEEN READY TO TALK SERIOUSLY OF ANY US DEPLOYMENT HOWEVER TOKEN).

4. NITZE SAID THAT DESPITE HIS EFFORTS HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CLARIFICATION OF THE INFORMAL SUGGESTION OF EQUAL WARHEAD REDUCTIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 26 AND NOVEMBER 13, ON WHICH DAY HE WAS INFORMED BY KVITSINSKY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO SUGGEST THAT THIS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD AS A US PROPOSAL.

5. IN CONCLUSION, NITZE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ROUND 6 DID NOT LEAD TO A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION, THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE, LIMITATION OF LRINF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AS THE RATIONALE FOR THEIR DEMAND FOR A MONOPOLY. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE SIDES THUS REMAINED THAT OF THE CONTINUING MONOPOLY OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILE FORCES IN EUROPE.

6. DURING DISCUSSION, NITZE CONFIRMED THAT PART OF THE US DELEGATION WOULD REMAIN IN GENEVA BUT THAT THE ENTIRE SOVIET TEAM WOULD LEAVE ON SATURDAY (26). HE SAID THAT KVITSINSKY HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUATION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS OR TRANSFER TO START. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS A DIVISION OF OPINION ON THIS IN MOSCOW.

7. HE OFFERED THREE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR SOVIET CONDUCT BETWEEN 12-21 NOVEMBER.

1) IT COULD REFLECT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW IN THAT THE LATTER FOUND IT

AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW IN THAT THE LATTER FOUND IT EASIER TO GET CONSENSUS ON THE PROPOSAL IF IT WERE PUT FORWARD AS A US IDEA. THEY HAD THEREFORE DELIBERATELY MIS-REPRESENTED THE INFORMAL CONTACTS IN MOSCOW.

II) THE SOVIET SIDE, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT IN PUTTING FORWARD THE CONCESSION OF ABANDONING THEIR RATIONALE FOR A MONOPLOY THEY WOULD OBTAIN NOTHING IN RETURN, HAD HAD TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH ENABLED THEM TO REPUDIATE THE CONCESSION IF NEED BE.

III) THIS WAS A PROPAGANDA OPERATION PLANNED FROM THE BEGINNING TO INFLUENCE THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE. NITZE TENDED TO FAVOUR THE SECOND EXPLANATION.

8. HE SAID KVITSINSKY HAD TOLD HIM THAT ACCEPTANCE OF ANY US DEPLOYMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF MILITARY OPINION IN MOSCOW, THE VIEWS OF WARSAW PACT ALLIES (NITZE EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM) AND THE REACTIONS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENTS AND OTHERS WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE SOVIET POSITION. NITZE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN A POLICY DECISION IN SUMMER 1982 THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT WITH NO AGREEMENT WAS PREFERABLE TO OVERT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ANY DEPLOYMENT IN AN AGREEMENT.

9. ON BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, NITZE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS NOW UNDERSTOOD THE LOGIC OF THE AMERICAN POSITION THAT THEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION, AND ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD BE A POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR NATO. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MILITARY COULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO RETAIN A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT PROPONDERANCE OF SS20S.

GRAHAM

NNNN

WAS THAT OK ??