



Prime Minister.

Agree that we should support the new
American proposals at Vienna?

PM/84/56

PRIME MINISTER

A-F.C. 13/4

Yes *not*
MBFR

(attached).

1. As you will recall from my minute to you of 1 March the Americans have proposed a new way of presenting the Western negotiating objectives in MBFR. Following intensive consultation with ourselves and the Germans, the Americans tabled their ideas in Brussels on 19 March. As you and Michael Heseltine had agreed, British officials supported the American approach.

2. The Germans, with some support from other Allies, have proposed certain amendments to the American approach. Although these in our view detract from the coherence and logic of the original US proposals, they do not overturn the basic concept as summarised in paragraph 5 of my earlier minute. The Americans clearly attach over-riding political importance to the West tabling at least an outline of its new position in Vienna before the end of the present round on 19 April, having apparently indicated bilaterally to the Soviet Union that the Alliance would do so. They have, therefore, now circulated in NATO a text revised to take account of German concerns, a copy of which I attach.

3. Ideally, we would have preferred to have had longer to consider the revised text and to try to improve on some of the details. I also consider that it would be tactically better to table the revised Western ideas early in the next round (beginning on 24 May) rather than now. This would make it more difficult for the East to reject our suggestions publicly without discussion and would provide an opportunity for the re-formulated Western approach to be launched at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of May. I

/accept



accept, however, that the rest of the Alliance support the American preference for tabling our ideas before the end of this round. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that it would be counterproductive for the UK to stand out alone in continuing to oppose this.

4. I am satisfied that the latest revision of the US ideas, despite some unsatisfactory features, preserves our two essential principles: that before any MBFR Treaty could be signed, the East would have to meet our requirements for:

- a) an exchange of data on combat and combat support forces of all direct participants in the MBFR negotiations, sufficient to fall within a range of Western data estimates and thus to supply the necessary basis of confidence; and
- b) the enhanced package of verification measures to be proposed by the West, fully adequate to ensure that reductions are taken and residual ceilings observed (the detailed elaboration of which within the Alliance is continuing).

On this basis I propose, provided you and Michael Heseltine see no objection, to instruct our delegations in Brussels and Vienna to co-operate with our Allies in tabling a re-formulation of the Western negotiating position on the lines of the attached text, which we shall try if possible to improve still further. NATO's Senior Political Committee will aim to reach agreement on a final version by the weekend; this will be automatically approved by the North Atlantic Council by close of play on Monday, 16 April if no delegation has signified to the contrary. If I have not heard otherwise from your office by noon that day, I



shall therefore assume that you are content and proceed accordingly.

5. I am copying this minute to Michael Heseltine and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 April 1984

S E C R E T



FILE
cc: P.C
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207

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April, 1984

MBFR

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 13 April.

Subject to the views of the Secretary of State for Defence, Mrs. Thatcher agrees that we should co-operate with our allies in tabling a reformulation of the Western negotiating position on the lines of the text annexed to Sir Geoffrey Howe's minute.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

S E C R E T

NR

CONFIDENTIAL

ack



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 13/1/16/4

16th April 1984

A.J.C. 16/4

f.a.

New Jms

MBFR

The Defence Secretary has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 13th April and is content to proceed as he proposes. *with AJC*
I am copying this letter to Roger Bone in the FCO, and to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Secretary's office.

Yms cv,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE: Arms Control Pt 5

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ARMY BUILDING WINDMILL FOUNDRY
CANTONMENT ROAD
SHERBORN WILT BA5 2RN



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16 APR 1984

11. TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

BEGIN TEXT:

. IN ITS ORAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983, AND IN ITS WRITTEN REPORT TO MINISTERS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1983, THE AD HOC GROUP RECOMMENDED THAT A TIMELY EVALUATION OF THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR WAS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES IN VIENNA. IN THE MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NAC IN DECEMBER IT WAS AGREED THAT A REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE.

. ON THE BASIS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND THE ALLIANCE POSITION, THE COUNCIL HAS DECIDED THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD LONG-STANDING WESTERN MBFR OBJECTIVES, THE AD HOC GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING INITIATIVE TO EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, AND TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

1) THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO MODIFY ITS REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, BY REQUIRING ONLY THAT THERE BE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, IN A FORMAT TO BE AGREED, SUFFICIENT TO FALL WITHIN A RANGE OF WESTERN DATA ESTIMATES, AND BY REQUIRING SUCH DATA ONLY ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE. THIS OFFER WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON NEW AND SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST IN MEETING WESTERN VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT EFFECTIVE CLARIFICATION OF FORCE STRENGTHS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH VERIFICATION MEASURES DURING AND AFTER THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

2) THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES OF THE DATA EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 1 ABOVE WOULD BE SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT (A). WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE, AND THE DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES TO BE APPLIED TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE CAN ONLY BE MADE ONCE ACTUAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN TABLED BY BOTH SIDES. THE TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED FOLLOWING

AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND DETERMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE. THE TREATY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE, INTER ALIA: (A) SPECIFICATION OF U.S./SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES AND INTERIM C/CS SUBCEILINGS FOR U.S./SOVIET FORCES ONLY; (B) SPECIFICATION OF FINAL NATIONAL CEILINGS ON U.S./SOVIET TOTAL GROUND FORCES (I.E., C/CS AND CSS COMBINED); (C) REQUIREMENT THAT THE U.S./SOVIET REDUCTIONS TO THE SPECIFIED SUBCEILINGS AND NATIONAL CEILINGS TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE EVEN IF NO AGREEMENT IS SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED ON SPECIFYING THE REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

3) FOLLOWING TREATY SIGNATURE, INITIAL U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY WOULD BE TAKEN IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN INTERIM RESIDUAL CEILINGS AT THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

4) U.S. AND SOVIET PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE DEVOTED TO CLARIFYING, WITH THE HELP OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION, THE COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. AS AN OBVIOUS COROLLARY, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS BUT SUBJECT TO U.S. AND SOVIET SUBCEILINGS FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, WOULD NOT INCREASE THE OVERALL PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES DURING THIS PHASE. (THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS FOR INDIVIDUAL UNITS IF THROUGH COMPENSATION IN OTHER UNITS THE OVERALL CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.)

5). THE SIZE AND TIMETABLE OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION

WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. THESE REDUCTIONS, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT IN INDIVIDUALS, WOULD LEAD TO INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT LEVELS TO BE DETERMINED. THESE INTERIM SUBCEILINGS WOULD BE IN EFFECT UNTIL COMPLETION OF ALL SPECIFIED WITHDRAWALS AND SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION THEREOF. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF THE SOVIET AND U.S. PERMANENT NATIONAL CEILINGS TO BE REACHED AT THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

6). REDUCTIONS BY ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE DETERMINED FOLLOWING THE PHASE TWO VERIFICATION OF THE COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7). TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEILINGS AND INTERIM SUBCEILINGS ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOR GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ROLES THOSE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OR OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE AREA. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION.

8). THE CURRENT WESTERN SCHEDULE FOR REDUCTIONS CALLS FOR A SEVEN-YEAR SCHEME WITH ALTERNATE YEARS DEVOTED TO VERIFICATION. FOCUSING SPECIFIED REDUCTIONS ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES MIGHT ALLOW SOME COMPRESSION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

YEAR 1: U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF 13,000 RESPECTIVELY IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS.

YEAR 2: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN AN AGREED FORMAT ON THE FORCES OF ALL SIDES, COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL

LEVEL OF GROUND FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD, VERIFICATION OF FORCE STRENGTH BY CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES, AND DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE REQUIRED TO REACH PARITY AT COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF 900,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND 700,000 GROUND FORCES COMBINED.

YEAR 3: REDUCTIONS BY U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS TO AN INTERIM SUB-CEILING ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

YEAR 4/5: COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES TO PARITY: 900,000 CEILING ON TOTAL FORCES, 700,000 TOTAL GROUND FORCES; NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION; COMPLETION OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES TO AGREED LEVELS (TO BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY). (ONCE THE LATTER LEVELS WERE ACHIEVED AND VERIFIED, THEY WOULD CEASE TO BE IN FORCE, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEING FREE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE BETWEEN C/CS AND OTHER FORCES AS LONG THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.

9) TO ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY VERIFIABLE UNDER THESE MODIFIED DATA CONDITIONS, THE PARTIES WILL NEED TO AGREE PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE TO THE ENHANCED PACKAGE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES PRESENTED BY THE WEST. THE ENHANCED PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE WEST IS AS SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT (B).

10). ALL ASSOCIATED MEASURES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURE 6 FOR COMBAT SERVE SUPPORT AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WOULD COME IN TO EFFECT UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.

11) ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

SHULTZ

Deyence Pt 5

Arms Control
MBFR

13 APR 1981

