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FM MOSCOW 291130Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1363 OF 29TH NOV 84

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NAOT, PRIORITY BONN, PARIS.

MY TELNO 1339 US/SOVIET RELATIONS: THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING.

1. AT MEETING OF THE FOUR AMBASSADORS ON 28 NOVEMBER ARTHUR HARTMAN REVIEWED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON 22 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 1331). HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING LEAKS IN WASHINGTON OVER THE WEEKEND THERE HAD BEEN A MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK COMPREHENSIVELY AND SUGGESTING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS GET TOGETHER. THE AMERICANS HAD INTERPRETED THIS AS A MOVE BY GROMYKO TO ASSERT HIS AUTHORITY AND FORESTALL THE POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL US NEGOTIATOR. THE JOINT STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH HASTILY AGREED ON THE EVENING OF THE 21ST, REPAID CAREFUL STUDY. ALMOST EVERY WORD HAD A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. IN AGREEING TO ENTER INTO "NEW" TALKS THE AMERICANS HAD LET THE RUSSIANS OFF THE HOOK OF THEIR OFT-REPEATED PRE-CONDITIONS. BY ACCEPTING THAT THE POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED SHOULD EMBRACE "THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS" CONCERNING NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS THE RUSSIANS HAD CONCEDED AN AMERICAN POINT. WITH THE REFERENCE TO WORKING OUT A JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON THE "AIMS" AS WELL AS THE SUBJECTS OF SUCH TALKS THE RUSSIANS HAD INSERTED A CONDITION (CF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR) WHICH COULD WELL PROVE TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE GENEVA MEETING. THE AMERICAN BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURES COULD WELL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET PREDILECTION FOR A PRIOR DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES.

2. THE MEETING IN GENEVA ON 7 AND 8 JANUARY WAS HOWEVER ACCEPTED BY THE RUSSIANS AS "TALKS ABOUT TALKS" A CONCEPT WHICH GROMYKO HAD PREVIOUSLY RIDICULED. HARTMAN AGREED THAT WHAT THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO ENVISAGE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS WAS TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS (A) ON SPACE AND (B) ON STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LATTER IN EFFECT A MERGER OF START AND INF - IE THE PRESCRIPTION IN THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR. (MR HEALEY HAD GIVEN A BRIEFING ON HIS TALK WITH ZAGLADIN TO HARTMAN AT MY RECEPTION ON 26 NOVEMBER FOR THE LABOUR PARTY DELEGATION, BUT THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT HIS ONLY SOURCE). OTHER ARMS-CONTROL ISSUES SUCH AS CW WERE EXCLUDED BUT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS ENVISAGED THAT TESTS SHOULD BE COVERED. THIS WAS ONE POINT WHICH HARTMAN WOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY AT A MEETING WHICH HE AND KENNEDY (IN MOSCOW FOR THE NPT DISCUSSIONS) WERE DUE TO HAVE WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKO ON 29 NOVEMBER.

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3. ANOTHER POINT FOR EXPLORATION WAS HOW THE RUSSIANS SAW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR POPOV IN LONDON HAD SPOKEN OF AN "ORGANIC RELATIONSHIP" (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 994 PARAGRAPH 1(C)). BESSMERTNIKH HAD REJECTED THE TERM LINKAGE (PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TUR) BUT THE PRAVDA REPORT ON 29 NOVEMBER OF CHERNENKO'S MEETING WITH THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR (MY TELEGRAM NO 1361 PARAGRAPH 4) REFERS SPECIFICALLY TO "LINKAGE" BETWEEN OUTER SPACE AND THE TWO CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAD STATED THAT THERE WERE NO PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING. THE "STATUS QUO ANTE" FORMULA ON THE REMOVAL OF PERSHING AND CRUISE HAD BEEN SHELVED. BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION (B) A FREEZE ON DEPLOYMENTS WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE IN ANY JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON AIMS AND, AS THE KINNOCK VISIT HAD CONFIRMED, THE RUSSIANS WOULD IN THE MEANTIME SEEK TO PERSUADE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT A FREEZE AT CURRENT UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS WAS A REASONABLE OPTION. AND WITH RESPECT TO OUTER SPACE WHERE AS HARTMAN AGREED, THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE GREATER INCENTIVE TO REACH A SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO STATED PRE-CONDITION, A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER AMERICAN ASAT TESTS WAS CLEARLY A PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THE NEXT TEST WHICH, AS THE RUSSIANS KNEW, WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE SOON AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING COULD BECOME A STUMBLING BLOCK TO PROGRESS. THE AMERICANS MIGHT AGREE TO POSTPONE THE TEST SEMI COLON OR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THIS TEST MIGHT BECOME A THEME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HARTMAN SAID THAT THE GENEVA MEETING COULD NOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND TWO DAYS. THE DISCUSSION WOULD, IF ALL WENT WELL, BE CONTINUED BY THE NEGOTIATORS, BUT THE PRINCIPALS COULD MEET AGAIN IF THE EXPERTS REGISTERED PROGRESS.

SUTHERLAND

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED	PS
SOVIET D	PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D	PS/MR RIFKIND
RESEARCH D	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS
EED	MR DEREK THOMAS
NAD	SIR W HARDING
WED	MR GOODALL
ACDD	MR JENKINS
F&D.	MR WESTON
	MR DAVID THOMAS

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