PHINIC MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 35/86

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 February 1986

Vear Premier Swar.

I have seen a copy of your letter to the Governor of 9 December requesting the introduction of certain limited sanctions against South Africa.

As you know, I have left President Botha in no doubt of my own feelings and the strong feelings of the British people on the evils of apartheid. We have made clear to the South African Government our view that urgent and fundamental reforms are needed if South Africa's problems are to be resolved peacefully.

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Nassau last October underlined the extent to which the members of the Commonwealth share these objectives. They decided that a Group of Eminent Persons, drawn from the Commonwealth, should seek to promote dialogue between the parties in South Africa. The Group is now beginning its work and is expected to visit South Africa shortly. It was also agreed at Nassau that after six months there would be a review of the situation to consider whether adequate progress had been made in South Africa and what more could be done.

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As I explained at our meeting in Hamilton and subsequently at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Nassau, we remain firmly opposed to economic and trade boycotts. We believe that the steps outlined in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Accord of 20 October represent the soundest basis for achieving progress towards peace and democracy in South Africa, leaving the South African Government in no doubt about the need for reform, while not damaging the South African economy on which the livelihood of all its peoples depend. On the basis of that agreement we would have no objection to the Bermuda Government's continuing its long-standing policy of not investing Government funds in South Africa. However, it will be immediately clear to you that the proposal to ban all imports from South Africa would go further not only than any measures we have taken ourselves but also than anything contained in the Commonwealth Accord, which continues to be the basis for our policies. It would also be incompatible with our GATT obligations, which extend to Bermuda. I understand that the Governor has already explained these difficulties to you.

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Meanwhile our close association does mean, of course, that Bermuda joins with Britain in accepting the wide range of measures agreed to in the Commonwealth Accord.

I greatly value our exchanges on international problems, and I realise that this advice will come as something of a disappointment to you. I recognise the strength of feeling in Bermuda about the situation in South Africa and the urgent

desire to make some contribution towards changing it for the better. We share that objective. However, I remain firmly convinced that it can be most effectively achieved by adopting the measured approach agreed at Nassau.

Jours Drively

Margant Maliter

all of the sea

#### 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 February 1986

#### BERMUDA: SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 26 February reporting Premier Swan's request that he should be allowed to publish the Prime Minister's letter of 17 February to him about the Bermuda Government's wish to enforce certain economic measures against South Africa.

The Prime Minister is content for the letter to be published.

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING RESTRICTED Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH 26 February 1986 Ivan Charles Bermuda: Sanctions Against South Africa Premier Swan has sought our agreement to his publishing the Prime Minister's letter of 17 February to him about the Bermuda Government's wish to enforce certain economic measures against South Africa (Hamilton telno 19 of 21 February, copy enclosed). We believe that it is in HMG's best interest to agree to Premier Swan's suggestion. The Prime Minister's letter contains a firm and lucid explanation of HMG's views which, while expressing sympathy with the strength of Bermudian feelings on apartheid. explains why we cannot approve all the measures the Bermuda Government would like to take. It is inevitable that Premier Swan will refer to this letter in responding to Parliamentary and other enquiries about the outcome of his consultations with HMG on the sanctions issue. It is also probable, however much we may wish otherwise, that the question of sanctions may be linked in discussion in Bermuda with the quite separate issue of the proposed independence referendum. In the circumstances Premier Swan's suggestion that the Prime Minister's letter be allowed to speak for itself has merit: publication of the letter would avoid the risks of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of its contents arising from selective quotations or paraphrases, which might embarrass HMG not only in our relations with Bermuda but in the wider international (particularly Commonwealth) context. (R N Culshaw) Private Secretary C D Powell Esq PS/10 Downing Street COVERING RESTRICTED

- 3. SWAN HAS SUGGESTED THAT AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF LETTING HAS THAT OF BE LETTER SPEAK FOR ITSELF IS TO PUBLISH IT. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO BE THIS IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE.
- 14. I SHOULD GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE ON THIS PREFERABLY NO LATER THAN 1600Z ON WEDNESDAY, 26TH.

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PS IMAS CHALKER.
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SOUTH AFRICA
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CONFIDENTIAL whether it was Foreign and Commonwealth Office to my no prevent from imposing a London SWIA 2AH from bout Africa. ban on all imports erode our authority as he administering penter no do so would dependent tenision: and course us some political embarrassmet. 1 think Bermuda: Sanctions against South Africald you Your letter of 21 January asked whether there

would be wider policy or constitutional implications involved in allowing Bermuda to ban all imports from South Africa.

We have carefully reconsidered this difficult question. Our view remains that in the context of our policy towards South Africa, agreement to Bermuda's request could be potentially very damaging.

The pressure within the Commonwealth for us to adopt further sanctions against South Africa is likely to increase in the light of the June 1986 review of the Commonwealth Accord. A decision now to allow Bermuda to impose sanctions would undermine our ability to resist such pressure (since it could be seen as presaging a change of policy on our part). There would also be the embarrassment of defending such Bermudian action (which would be in contravention of GATT rules) publicly in the GATT, where the UK speaks on behalf of Bermuda.

In addition to these difficulties, there would be constitutional implications. Bermuda, in common with other Dependent Territories under the Crown, enjoys a wide measure of internal autonomy, but the UK Government retains special powers in certain areas essential to the fulfilment of the UK's obligations as the administering power. These include the territory's external relations, into which category the question of economic sanctions by the Bermuda Government falls. Under the Bermuda Constitution Order 1968 the Governor would require the Secretary of State's authority before assenting on behalf of HM The Queen to legislation by the Bermuda Government to enforce the proposed measures against South Africa. In giving any such authority, the Secretary of State would be held to endorse Bermuda's action.

/If HMG



If HMG did allow the Bermuda Government to pursue policies in the external relations field which conflicted with our own, this would set a precedent which would become known not only in the Commonwealth but also in our other dependent territories. Demands from other dependent territories' governments for similar concessions could be expected to follow. Such pressure could prove difficult to resist, but yielding could set in progress erosion of our authority as the administering power in our dependent territories.

Another complication is that we have learned that the Bermudians intend to introduce legislation into their Senate on 19 February for a referendum on the question of independence. This question has been aired on a number of occasions in recent years, but there has never so far been evidence of a public majority in favour of independence. However, the Bermudian Premier feels that the issue should be debated again. We would not wish to stand in the way of independence if that were clearly the wish of the Bermudian people. However, since we have important defence and other interests to secure in Bermuda (it falls into the NATO area and contains vital air and naval facilities for SACLANT) it would not be to our advantage for the question of sanctions to become entangled with the question of independence.

We therefore recommend that the Prime Minister should write to Premier Swan as in the enclosed draft. If the Prime Minister particularly wished this to be delivered by an emissary Sir William Harding could do this, since he will be returning to UK after talks in Washington on 18 February and could break his journey at Bermuda. On the other hand the Prime Minister may prefer to ask the Governor to deliver the message in the usual way, and to hold in reserve the possibility of sending a senior official or Minister to Bermuda.

I am copying this letter to John Moss.

Jours eva

(R N Culshaw)

C D Powell Esq No.10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note TYPE: Draft/Final 1+ FROM: Reference Prime Minister DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TO: Your Reference Top Secret The Hon J W Swan JP MP Secret Copies to: Confidential Restricted Unclassified SUBJECT: PRIVACY MARKING I have seen a copy of your letter to the Governor .....In Confidence of 9 December requesting the introduction of certain CAVEAT..... limited sanctions against South Africa. As you know, I have left President Botha in no doubt of my own feelings and the strong Keelings of the British people on the evils of apartheid. We have made clear to the South African Government our view that urgent and fundamental reforms are needed if South Africa's problems are to be resolved peacefully. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Nassau last October underlined the extent to which the members of the Commonwealth share these objectives. They decided that a Group of Eminent Persons, drawn from the Commonwealth, should seek to promote dialogue between the parties in South Africa. The Group is now beginning its work and is expected to visit South Enclosures—flag(s)..... Africa shortly. It was also agreed at Nassau that, after six months there would be a review of the situation to consider whether adequate progress had been made in

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/As I explained

DSR 11 (Revised)

As I explained at our (Hamilton meeting and subsequently at the CHOGM at Nassau, we remain firmly opposed to economic and trade boycotts. We believe that the steps outlined in the CHOGM Accord of 20 October represent the soundest basis for achieving progress towards peace and democracy in South Africa, leaving the South African Government in no doubt about the need for reform, while not damaging the South African economy on which the livelihood of all its peoples depend. On the basis of that agreement we would have no objective to the Bermuda Government's continuing its long-standing policy of not investing Government funds in South Africa. However, it will be immediately clear to you that the proposal to ban all imports from South Africa would go further not only than any measures we have taken ourselves but also than anything contained in the Commonwealth Accord, which continues to be the basis for our policies. It would also be incompatible with our GATT obligations, which extend to Bermuda. I understand that the Governor has already explained these difficulties to you.

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# DEPUTY, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

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Tremier HAMILTON, BERMUDA'

The Cabinet Office Hamilton 5-24, Bermuda

9th December, 1985.

His Excellency the Governor

Your Excellency,

Sec (13)

### Sanctions Against South Africa

As you are aware, this matter was considered by Cabinet on Tuesday, 3rd December, 1985, and Cabinet asked that strong representations be made through you to Her Majesty's Government to permit Bermuda Government to pass, and you to assent to, legislation to implement the limited sanctions against South Africa which are outlined in the memorandum attached.

Bermuda Government believes that the introduction of limited sanctions on South Africa has the overwhelming support of Bermudians. Therefore, if Government is to maintain its integrity, it is imperative that it implements the limited sanctions proposed.

I would be grateful to meet with you, at your earliest convenience, to amplify Bermuda Government views on this matter.

Premier

### Statement by the Premier, The Hon. John W. Swan on South Africa

Let me once again state my Government's profound opposition to apartheid and the abhorrence and concern we feel over the continuing human suffering caused by this system which we strongly condemn.

Over the last few weeks, I have met and consulted with a wide cross-section of the community over what Bermuda might do in encouraging reforms and the dismantling of the system of apartheid in South Africa.

As a small country there is little that we can do alone beyond emphasising our disapproval of apartheid. However, those actions that we take together with the actions of many other countries could serve to bring about reforms. At this time Government therefore proposes to -

- Prohibit the importation of all commercial goods from South Africa;
- (2) Prohibit the purchase and importation of the Kruggerrand; and
- (3) Continue its long-standing policy of not investing funds in South Africa.

The Cabinet Offi 3.10.85 South Africa; less 178



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

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21 January 1986

From the Private Secretary

#### BERMUDA: SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 20 January enclosing a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Premier Swan, dealing with the latter's request to allow Bermuda to take certain economic measures against South Africa.

The Prime Minister has questioned the wisdom of preventing Premier Swan from acting as he wishes. She would like to know whether there would be wider policy or constitutional implications involved in allowing Bermuda to ban all imports from South Africa. Your letter speaks of embarrassment to HMG from having to agree to legislation banning imports from South Africa. She wonders how extensive such embarrassment would really be: and whether the embarrassment of refusing the request might not be as great or greater.

I should emphasise that the Prime Minister's mind is not made up. She would like to see the issues examined rather more fully.

C D POWELL

Robert Culshaw, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET NOT SENT FURTHER DRAFT REQUESTED THE PRIME MINISTER As you well know, I personally abhor apartheid and have left President Botha in no doubt of my own feelings and the strong feelings of the British public on this subject. We have made it very clear to the South African Government that urgent and fundamental reforms must be made if South Africa's problems are to be resolved peacefully. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Nassau last October underlined the extent to which the members of the Commonwealth share these objectives. However, as I explained at our Nassau meeting, the United Kingdom remains firmly opposed to economic and trade boycotts. We believe that the steps outlined in the CHOGM Accord of 20 October represent the soundest basis for achieving progress towards peace and democracy in South Africa, leaving the South African Government in no doubt about the need for reform, while not damaging the South African economy on which the livelihood of all its peoples depend. I sympathise with the objectives set out in your note to the Governor of 9 December. We of course have no objection to the Bermuda Government continuing its longstanding policy of not investing Government funds in South Africa. But the proposal to ban all imports from South

Africa goes further not only than any measures we have taken ourselves but also than anything contained in the Commonwealth Accord.

As to the question of a ban on the importation of Krugerrands the question here is one of compatibility with our obligations under the GATT which also extend to Bermuda. This is currently under examination by officials in London and I have given instructions that the Governor should be informed once the position is clearer.

I recognise the strength of feeling in Bermuda about the situation in South Africa and the urgent desire to make some contribution towards bringing about the fundamental reforms we all wish to see. However, I remain firmly convinced that these can be most effectively achieved by adopting the measured approach agreed at Nassau and that Bermuda will be acting in the best interests of all concerned by adhering to that policy.

With best wishes,



### 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Vear Fremer Swar.


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However, as I explained at our Nassau meeting, the United Kingdom remains firmly opposed to economic and trade boycotts. We believe that the steps outlined in the CHOGM Accord of 20 October represent the soundest basis for achieving progress towards peace and democracy in South Africa, leaving the South African Government in no doubt about the need for reform, while not damaging the South African economy on which the livelihood of all its peoples depend.

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pre we wrie to warie in their view. Couldrenot bar their if he wishes?

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1986

Jean Charles,

### Bermuda: Sanctions Against South Africa

The Prime Minister of Bermuda has submitted a formal request that the Governor should represent to HMG the Bermuda Government's case for enforcing certain economic measures against South Africa. (Mr Swan's letter of 9 December 1985 to the Governor, copy enclosed.) Two of the measures in question would necessitate local legislation requiring the agreement of HMG.

It would clearly be embarrassing for HMG to agree to a dependent territory passing legislation imposing a trade boycott against South Africa. It would be equally difficult - and perhaps a shade invidious - for us to veto measures which are part of the CHOGM Accord (Krugerrand) or are already HMG's policy (Government investment). There appears to be strong support in Bermuda for some form of action against South Africa and a negative attitude on our own part could have an adverse effect on international (particularly Commonwealth) perceptions of our policy towards South Africa.

We therefore believe that it is in HMG's best interests to respond as sympathetically as possible to Mr Swan's approach. It is clear that we could not countenance a ban on South African imports into Bermuda, but we would have no objection to the Bermuda Government's continuing its longstanding policy of not investing Government funds in South Africa. It would be difficult to resist the Bermudan wish to take steps to prevent the import of Krugerrands in accordance with the CHOGM agreement, although the modalities and international aspects (eg in the GATT) would need further inter-departmental consideration.

The Prime Minister has established a friendly relationship with Mr Swan and their meeting on Bermuda on 16 October will undoubtedly have influenced his thinking on HMG's likely attitude to the sanctions question. The Prime Minister may therefore wish to respond to Mr Swan's letter. I attach a draft reply for her signature.

I am copying this letter to John Mogg in the DTI.

Dono eva

(R N Culshaw) Private Secretary

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C D Powell Esq 10 Downing Street

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	Prime Minister				
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
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## DEPUTY, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

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