

END TFC LCB429

*Copy passed FCO.  
FOR GALS WORTHY.*

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FM AIRBORNE  
TO CABINET OFFICE 003 DESKBY 020800Z  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE DESKBY 020800Z FOR ADDISON, NO 10 DOWNING  
STREET AND GALS WORTHY, FCO FROM CHARLES POWELL.  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

THE PRIME MINISTER FINDS THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO HM  
AMBASSADOR CAPETOWN TOO NEGATIVE. WHILE SHE RECOGNISES THAT  
THERE IS NO REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING A DETAILED STATEMENT  
ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO, SHE THINKS THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO  
GET A BRIEF REFERENCE THERE TO THE SUMMIT'S SUPPORT FOR A  
D I A L O G U E BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK  
REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE  
ON ALL SIDES, LEADING TO THE END OF APARTHEID AND A SYSTEM OF  
GOVERNMENT WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEREFORE WANT POINT (C) OF THE  
DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS MODIFIED TO SAY THAT, WHILE A DETAILED TEXT  
OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA STANDS A LITTLE OR NO CHANCE,  
SHE WILL DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF AND BALANCED REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA  
(ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH) IN THE  
SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS. WHILE SHE CANNOT GUARANTEE THIS, SHE WILL DO  
HER BEST.

WOULD THE FCO PLEASE TELEGRAPH TO US IN SEOUL OR TO THE  
AIRCRAFT TWO OR THREE SENTENCES ON THE LINES WHICH I HAVE  
SUGGESTED (IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE), WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD  
PUT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY  
TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IF SHE SO DECIDES.  
THESE MIGHT BE DRAWN FROM RELEVANT PASSAGES IN THE CHOGM  
CONCLUSIONS (INDEED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A COPY OF THESE  
AVAILABLE IN TOKYO).  
GRS 00274  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE DESKBY 020800Z FOR ADDISON, NO 10 DOWNING STREET AND GALSWORTHY, FCO FROM CHARLES POWELL.  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

THE PRIME MINISTER FINDS THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO HM AMBASSADOR CAPETOWN TOO NEGATIVE. WHILE SHE RECOGNISES THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING A DETAILED STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO, SHE THINKS THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO GET A BRIEF REFERENCE THERE TO THE SUMMIT'S SUPPORT FOR A D I A L O G U E BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, LEADING TO THE END OF APARTHEID AND A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEREFORE WANT POINT (C) OF THE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS MODIFIED TO SAY THAT, WHILE A DETAILED TEXT OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA STANDS A LITTLE OR NO CHANCE, SHE WILL DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF AND BALANCED REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA (ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH) IN THE SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS. WHILE SHE CANNOT GUARANTEE THIS, SHE WILL DO HER BEST.

WOULD THE FCO PLEASE TELEGRAPH TO US IN SEOUL OR TO THE AIRCRAFT TWO OR THREE SENTENCES ON THE LINES WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED (IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE), WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD PUT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IF SHE SO DECIDES. THESE MIGHT BE DRAWN FROM RELEVANT PASSAGES IN THE CHOGM CONCLUSIONS (INDEED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A COPY OF THESE AVAILABLE IN TOKYO).

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FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE

DESJBY 020800Z for Addison, No. 10 Downing Street and Galsworthy, FCO from Charles Powell.

Subject; President Botha's message.

The Prime Minister finds the proposed instructions to HM Ambassador Capetown too negative. While she recognises that there is no <sup>realistic</sup> chance of negotiating a detailed statement on South Africa at Tokyo, she thinks that we ought to try to get a brief reference there to the Summit's support for a dialogue between the South African Government and black representatives, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, leading to ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> end of apartheid and a system of government which protects the rights of minorities.

The Prime Minister would therefore want point (c) of the draft instructions modified to say that, while a detailed text of the sort proposed by President Botha stands little or no chance, she will discuss with President Reagan and other Heads of Government the possibility of a brief and balanced reference to South Africa (on the lines I have suggested in the preceding paragraph) in the Summit conclusions. While she cannot guarantee this, she will do her best.

Would the FCO please telegraph to us in Seoul or to the aircraft two or three sentences on the lines which I have suggested <sup>(in ~~para~~ paragraph 1 above)</sup>, which the Prime Minister could put to President Reagan on Sunday afternoon, and subsequently to other Heads of Government if she so decides. These might be drawn from relevant passages in the CHOGM conclusions (indeed it would be helpful to have a copy of these available in Tokyo).

C.D.P.

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FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 021230Z SEOUL  
TELNO 228  
OF 021200Z MAY 86

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FOR POWELL FROM GALSWORTHY

YOUR AIRBORNE TELEGRAM OF 2 MAY: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

1. THE CHOGM CONCLUSIONS (A COPY OF WHICH WE SHALL BE BRINGING WITH US TO TOKYO) DOES NOT FULLY FIT THE BILL, THOUGH IT DOES CONTAIN LANGUAGE ON SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. HOWEVER, THE LUXEMBOURG ACCORD (A COPY OF WHICH WE SHALL ALSO BRING) CONTAINS HELPFUL LANGUAGE ABOUT PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

2. FOLLOWING IS A SUGGESTED PASSAGE ON SOUTH AFRICA AS REQUESTED, LARGELY DRAWN FROM BOTH DOCUMENTS:

ON SOUTH AFRICA, THE SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS NOTED AND WELCOMED THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS. THEY EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE AIM OF FACILITATING A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE ACROSS LINES OF COLOUR, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. THEY CALLED FOR THE COMPLETE ABOLITION OF APARTHEID AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC, NON-RACIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY INTENDS TO INSTRUCT HM AMBASSADOR TO TELL THE SAG THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF A RELATIVELY SHORT BUT BALANCED REFERENCE, BUT NOT TO BE DRAWN ON ITS LIKELY CONTENT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The proposed reply looks a shade too negative. It certainly won't be possible to negotiate a full text on South Africa. But I would not exclude a couple of sentences referring to the Summit's support for a dialogue between the S.A.G. & black representatives, in the context of a suspension of violence. You could at least say that you will discuss ~~this~~ this possibility with the President. Agree? C.D.P.

012020Z MAY 86  
FM CABINET OFFICE  
TO AIRBORNE 002 IMMEDIATE  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
AIRBORNE 002  
FOLLOWING FOR ATTENTION OF CHARLES POWELL  
FROM MARK ADDISON

Tel 020921

PLEASE SEE FOLLOWING REQUEST FROM FCO FOR CLEARANCE. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT YOU HAVE WITH YOU CAPE TOWN TELS 242 AND 243 OF 1/5/86. THEY CAN BE TRANSMITTED TO YOU IF YOU DO NOT HAVE THEM.

DEAR CHARLES,

SOUTH AFRICA

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED ADVANCE COPIES OF P W BOTHA'S LATEST MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER, TOGETHER WITH SIR P MOBERLY'S COMMENTS. I ATTACH COPIES TO CAPE TOWN TELNOS 242 AND 243 FOR EASE OF REFERENCE.

THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPEAR TO HAVE QUITE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT THEY MIGHT HOPE TO ACHIEVE BY WAY OF A STATEMENT FROM THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT. IN LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S EARLIER OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TRIED TO RIDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR OFF A STATEMENT WHEN THEY MET ON 25 APRIL: HE ARGUES THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO NEGOTIATE A STATEMENT, THAT THE AGENDA WAS ALREADY OVERLOADED, AND THAT THE IDEA WAS A PANDORA'S BOX BECAUSE THERE COULD BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY STATEMENT WOULD BE FREE OF POINTS WHICH WERE UNPALATABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. MORRALL APPEARED TO TAKE THE POINT, BUT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE NEVERTHELESS GONE AHEAD. IT MAY BE THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM IN THIS, THOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT, SINCE THEY HAVE AS YOU KNOW FAVOURED A DISCUSSION AND STATEMENT FROM THE SUMMIT.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY GREATLY DOUBTS WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A CONSENSUS AT THE SUMMIT IN FAVOUR OF A STATEMENT ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE PRESIDENT. THERE WOULD BE REAL PROBLEMS OVER LANGUAGE: FOR INSTANCE THE REFERENCE TO THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN A MANNER ENSURING NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OF ANOTHER, WHICH WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY SOME AS WHITE INSISTENCE ON A VETO OVE

PALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS: AND THE BALD STATEMENT THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS HARDLY BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. AS REGARDS THE SOUTH AFRICAN WISH TO HAVE THE SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS LAY DOWN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY FUTURE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEVERAL SUMMIT COUNTRIES SHARE OUR VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES MUST REACH A PEACEFULLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT IT IS NOT FOR OUTSIDERS TO PRESCRIBE PARTICULAR SOLUTIONS.

IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VIEW, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE BEST ADVISED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMIT BEFORE REPLYING TO THE STATE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SEES ADVANTAGE IN OUR AMBASSADOR AT CAPE TOWN BEING INSTRUCTED MEANWHILE TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO STEER THE INITIATIVE NOW LAUNCHED TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION THERE WILL BE MANY DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN PRODUCING A SATISFACTORY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE, WHILE EVEN IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE ONE, THE RESULT MAY NOT BE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S TASTE. I ATTACH A DRAFT TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR P MOBERLY ACCORDINGLY. YOU WILL SEE THAT IT DOES NOT RULE OUT ALTOGETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT, SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE UP TO. ITS MAIN PURPOSE IS TO LOWER SOUTH AFRICAN EXPECTATIONS.

DRAFT BEGINS

YOUR TELNOS 242 AND 243: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER (AT ATL EVENTS BEFORE THE EVENING OF 5 MAY).
2. YOU SHOULD TELL BOTHA THAT THE RRHME MINISTER READ THE STATE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WITH GREAT INTEREST. SHE WILL BE REPLYING AFTER THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. MEANWHILE, HER PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:  
(A) IT IS VERY USEFUL THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN TO HER AND THE OTHER SUMMIT LEADERS. THIS WILL HELP ENSURE THAT WHEN SOUTH AFRICA IS DISCUSSED HER COLLEAGUES HAVE A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERNS:  
(B) MRS THATCHER FEELS SHE OUGHT TO WARN THE STATE PRESIDENT BOTH THAT THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT TIME AT TOKYO TO NEGOTIATE A SATISFACTORY TEXT: THE POLITICAL AGENDA IS ALREADY OVER-CROWDED: AND THAT IT IS TO SAY THE LEAST UNLIKELY THAT ANY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE ON THE LINES HE ENVISAGES: SOME OF THOSE CONCERNED MAY WELL FEEL THAT SUCH A STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE CRITICISM OF SOUTH AFRICA AND A CALL FOR FASTER PROGRESS TOWARDS THE COMPLETE DISMANTLEMENT OF APARTHEID.  
(C) THIS IS WHY THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NOTHING AT ALL SAID IN PUBLIC, OR AT MOST A REFERENCE BY THE JAPANESE CHAIRMAN IN HIS FINAL SUMMING UP TO THE FACT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THAT THE SUMMIT LEADERS HAD WELCOMED PROGRESS MADE BY COMGEP, AND SO ON.
3. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF YOUR TALK WITH PIK BOTHA IS THUS TO EXPLAIN THAT ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO STEER THE SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVE TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION THERE WILL BE MANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF ANY ATTEMPT TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO A STATEMENT AT TOKYO. APART FROM THE PROBLEMS THAT OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE OVER SOME OF THE LANGUAGE (EG NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OVER ANY OTHER) THE SUGGESTION THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THE STAGE REACHED IN THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE: A NUMBER OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE RELUCTANT TO ENDORSE IN PUBLIC THE VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE NOW DONE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED OF THEM IN RETURN FOR A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. MORE GENERALLY, OUR OWN CONSISTENT POSITION HAS AS YOU KNOW BEEN THAT IT IS NOT FOR OUTSIDERS TO PREHEND THE SHAPE OF A SOLUTION, WHICH MUST BE REACHED THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA.

ENDS  
GRS 01100  
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Private Secretary

cc: PS/Number 10 ✓  
Sir R Armstrong  
Mr Braithwaite  
Mr Ingham  
Mr Meyer

SOUTH AFRICA: HANDLING OF P W BOTHA'S REQUEST FOR A STATEMENT

1. Discussion this morning with the Japanese, US and Canadian Foreign Ministers revealed strong doubts about the possibility of getting agreement at Tokyo on a brief balance statement of support for a dialogue between South Africa and black representatives of the kind the Prime Minister hopes to be able to achieve. They all agreed that the original South African expectations were quite unrealistic.

2. The arguments put forward were:

- (i) any proposal for a positive statement on South Africa would be met with counter-proposals for additions. These would be on standard lines (condemnation of apartheid, demand for release of Mandela, faster progress towards dismantling of apartheid etc) of the kind that would be unwelcome to Botha at present.
- (ii) the above risk would be particularly acute in the case of a separate statement. It might be reduced if a short passage could be included in a more general statement. But there is no suitable vehicle available. The general declaration of economic conclusions are quite unsuitable;
- (iii) an alternative possibility might be for a brief reference to be made to South Africa in the Chairman's summing-up if suitable wording could be agreed and used.

3. The dangers to the COMGEP process of an unbalanced statement from Tokyo are particularly acute at present. A bad reaction in South Africa would rub off on their attitude towards COMGEP and prejudice the prospects for a further visit to South Africa. Great care will therefore be needed here.

4. The best approach would be for the Prime Minister to sound out her colleagues (especially The Netherlands Prime Minister, also President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl) before the joint session on the afternoon of 5 May. It would be necessary to explain the rationale for making a positive statement at this juncture, and avoiding the standard condemnatory language. If their reaction was positive, it would be worth circulating the attached draft passage at the joint session.

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
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5. The risk would be that additions would be proposed drawn from recent statements on South Africa, eg by the 12, which would therefore be difficult to reject.

6. It would need to be clearly understood that if a passage on these lines was agreed for use by the Chairman in his summing up he should stick to the agreed wording.

7. If the responses from the Prime Minister's colleagues were equivocal, it would be best to avoid these risks altogether and to invite the Chairman simply to state, in his summing up, that the question of South Africa had been discussed, but avoid going into details.



4 May 1986

D M D Thomas

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SUGGESTED PASSAGE ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR CHAIRMAN'S SUMMING UP

On South Africa, the Seven Summit leaders noted and welcomed the progress made so far by the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons. They expressed full support for the aim of facilitating a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion in South Africa in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. They called for the complete abolition of apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic, non-racial system of government which would ensure the protection of minorities.

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