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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
TELNO 408
OF 080947Z JUL 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL OBASANJO AND MR. FRASER. PLEASE ARRANGE TO HAVE IT DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

FOLLOWING THE RECENT MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL I SHOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW HOW WE SEE THE NEXT STEPS IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

YOU WILL KNOW FROM OUR MEETING ON 12 JUNE, WHEN YOU KINDLY CALLED ON ME TO DISCUSS THE COMGEP REPORT, THAT LIKE ALL MY COLLEAGUES IN THE COMMONWEALTH, I WAS GREATLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE BREAKDOWN OF YOUR MISSION. AS I SAID THEN, IT IS TRAGIC THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH YOU SHOULD AT THE LAST HAVE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

SINCE WE MET WE HAVE, OF COURSE, ALL BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MORE IS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. SO TOO HAVE MY COLLEAGUES AT THE HEADS OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. LIKE US IN THE COMMONWEALTH

THEY BELIEVE, WITH THE SAME PROFOUND CONVICTION, THAT THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH SET AT NASSAU - TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES - REMAIN ENTIRELY VALID. AFTER ALL, THOSE WERE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMUNITY TOO SET ITSELF AT LUXEMBOURG LAST SEPTEMBER, AND AGAIN AT THE JOINT MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES IN LUSAKA EARLIER THIS YEAR.

THE QUESTION WE ASKED EACH OTHER AT THE HAGUE WAS THIS: IS NOT THE PROSPECT OF A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA SO SERIOUS THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE, BUILDING ON THE WORK WHICH YOUR GROUP HAD DONE?

A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ESTABLISHING WHETHER THAT ROUTE IS STILL POSSIBLE MUST BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MY READING OF THE AFRIKANER CHARACTER IS QUITE CLEAR: IF WE ARE TO AVOID SIMPLY DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE INSIDE THE LAAGER, THEN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING THEM TO REACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RULE OUT DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE.

IT WAS WITH THOSE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I APPROACHED MY MEETING IN THE HAGUE WITH MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT WE COULD TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE KEY MOVE THAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WHICH WE ALL WANT WAS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY TO RELEASE NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. YOU WILL RECALL MY OWN STRONG FEELING ABOUT THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THESE STEPS. OPEN SQUARE BRACKET FOR OBASANJO ONLY: AND I RECALL YOUR SAYING TO ME ON 12 JUNE THAT THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA COULD OPEN THE WAY TO A SOLUTION. CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET. DESPITE THE OBVIOUS

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DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WE DECIDED TOO THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE A EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO THAT END. IT WAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT GEOFFREY HOWE SHOULD GO TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNITY, TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION.

IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN SUPPORT OF THAT MISSION THE TWELVE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ON FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED, COVERING IN PARTICULAR A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORT OF COAL, IRON, STEEL AND GOLD COINS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DECISION TO CONSULT OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY MEASURES WAS, OF COURSE, INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE POSITION WE IN THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN: IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND YOUR FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP MUST BE CONCERNED THAT THIS MOVE BY THE COMMUNITY MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE WORK ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED TOGETHER. I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IS VERY MUCH IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF WHAT THE COMMONWEALTH AGREED IN NASSAU. THE MISSION BEING UNDERTAKEN BY GEOFFREY HOWE IS NOT INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE OR UNDERMINE THE FINDINGS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP. ITS AIM, ON THE CONTRARY, IS TO BUILD ON YOUR WORK AND FOLLOW THE COURSE WHICH YOU CHARTED, IN PURSUIT OF THE SAME OBJECTIVES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT THE END OF OUR MEETING YOU SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT MYSELF MEET PRESIDENT BOTHA. I DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, AT THIS STAGE AT LEAST. BUT IT WAS WITH YOUR SUGGESTION VERY MUCH IN MIND THAT WE DECIDED ON GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION. THE SEVEN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES AT THE MEETING IN LONDON IN AUGUST

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TO REVIEW THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD. MEANWHILE I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION IS MOST SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY INTENDED. IF IT IS TO HAVE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AGAINST WHAT WE MUST ALL SEE AS VERY LONG ODDS, HE WILL NEED TO HAVE THE CHANCE OF MEETING A WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. I DO VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO LEND SUCH SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT AS YOU CAN.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKET FOR OBASANJO ONLY: FINALLY, I SHOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO ADD MY OWN PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO THE PART YOU PLAYED IN THE COMGEP MISSION. THE STATESMANSHIP WHICH YOU CONTRIBUTED IN SUCH FULL MEASURE THROUGHOUT REAPED PRAISE NOT ONLY FOR YOURSELF BUT FOR YOUR COUNTRY AND THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE. I THANK YOU MOST WARMLY. CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET
ENDS

HOWE

LIMITED

HD OF SAFD

PS

PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/PUS

MR E FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

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8/KW



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: FOLLOW UP TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Rf FOR
TELEGRAM

Thank you for your letter of 4 July enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser. I enclose a message with some revisions in a form which the Prime Minister has agreed. Provided the Foreign Secretary is content with it as amended, it may be despatched.

(C. D. POWELL)


Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OUT TELEGRAM

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	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	
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AND TO	8	AND TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
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	11	EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES
	12	1. Following is text of a message from the Prime Minister to
	13	General Obasanjo and Mr. Fraser. Please arrange to have it
	14	delivered as soon as possible.
	15	Begins
	16	Following last week's meeting of the European Council I should
	17	like to let you know how we see the next steps in relation
	18	to South Africa.
	19	
	20	You will know from our meeting on 12 June, when you kindly
	21	called on me to discuss the COMGEP report, that like all my
	22	colleagues in the Commonwealth, I was greatly disappointed
	23	by the breakdown of your mission. As I said then, it is tragic
	24	that having achieved so much you should at the last have found
	25	it impossible to reach a successful conclusion.
///	26	
//	27	Since we met we have, of course, all been considering what
/	28	more is needed to bring about a change in the attitude of the
	29	South African Government. So too have my colleagues at the



YYYY	Catchword: European		
MAIN	File number	Dept Private Office	Drafted by (Block capitals) C R Budd
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
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Precedence
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2 Heads of European Governments. Like us in the Commonwealth
3 they believe, with the same profound conviction, that the objec-
4 tives which the Commonwealth set at Nassau - to bring apartheid
5 to an end, through dialogue and a suspension of violence on
6 all sides - remain entirely valid. After all, those were the
7 objectives which the Community too set itself at Luxembourg
8 last September, and again at the joint meeting with the Front
9 Line States in Lusaka earlier this year.

10

11 The question we asked each other at The Hague was this: is
12 not the prospect of a rising tide of violence in South Africa
13 so serious, that we should make a further attempt to promote
14 dialogue, building on the work which your Group had done?

15

16 A crucial factor in establishing whether that route is still
17 possible must be the attitude of the South African Government.
18 My reading of the Afrikaner character is quite clear: if we
19 are to avoid simply driving President Botha and his people
20 inside the laager, then it is imperative that we should demon-
21 strate our disapproval and condemnation of the policies of
22 the South African Government without causing them to react
23 in such a way as to rule out dialogue and compromise.

24

25 It was with those thoughts in mind that I approached my meeting
26 in The Hague with my European Community colleagues. After
27 long discussion we reached agreement on the most effective
28 action that we could take at this stage.

29

30 We had no doubt that the key move that was necessary to promote
31 the genuine national dialogue which we all want was for the
32 South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson
33 Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on
34 the ANC, PAC and other political parties. You will recall

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Catchword: my

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
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2 my own strong feeling about the need to focus on these steps.
3 Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: And I recall your saying
4 to me on 12 June that the release of Nelson Mandela could open
5 the way to a solution. close square bracket. Despite the obvious
6 difficulties involved we decided too that it was right to under-
7 take a European diplomatic initiative to that end. It was
8 accordingly agreed that Geoffrey Howe should go to Southern
9 Africa, in his capacity as President of the European Council
10 of Ministers and with the full support of the Community, to
11 carry out this mission.

12

13 It was also agreed that during the next three months in support
14 of that mission the Twelve would enter into consultations with
15 the other industrialised countries on further measures which
16 might be needed, covering in particular a ban on new investment
17 and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from
18 South Africa. This decision to consult other industrialised
19 countries about possible contingency measures was, of course,
20 intended to reinforce the position we in the Commonwealth have
21 already taken: if measures are to be effective it is essential
22 that they should have the support of the industrialised countries
23 as a whole.

24

25 I can well understand that you and your fellow members of the
26 Eminent Persons Group must be concerned that this move by the
27 Community might cut across the work on which we have been engaged
28 together. I should like to give you an assurance that the
29 action we have taken with our European partners is very much
30 in keeping with the spirit of what the Commonwealth agreed
31 in Nassau. The mission being undertaken by Geoffrey Howe is
32 not intended to supersede or undermine the findings of the
33 Eminent Persons Group. Its aim, on the contrary, is to build
34 on your work and follow the course which you charted, in pursuit

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For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
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2 of the same objectives. You will recall that at the end of
3 our meeting you suggested that I might myself meet President
4 Botha. I did not think this would be appropriate, at this
5 stage at least. But it was with your suggestion very much
6 in mind that we decided on Geoffrey Howe's mission. The seven
7 Commonwealth heads of Government will have an opportunity to
8 discuss all these issues at the meeting in London in August
9 to review the Commonwealth Accord. Meanwhile I should like
10 to assure you that Geoffrey Howe's mission is most seriously
11 and sincerely intended. If it is to have a chance of success
12 against what we must all see as very long odds, he will need
13 to have the chance of meeting a wide range of people in Southern
14 Africa, as well as members of the South African Government.
15 I do very much hope that you will feel able to lend such support
16 and encouragement as you can.

17

18 Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: Finally, I should like
19 once more to add my own personal tribute to the part you played
20 in the COMGEP mission. The statesmanship which you contributed
21 in such full emasure throughout reaped praise not only for
22 yourself but for your country and the Commonwealth as a whole.
23 I thank you most warmly. close square bracket

24 Ends

25

26 Howe

27

28

29 YYY


30 MAIN

/// 31 SOUTHERN AFRICA

// 32 STANDARD (PALACE)

/ 33 SAFD

34 OADS



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Catchword:

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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- 1
- 2 CCD
- 3 NAD
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- 5 SPD
- 6 MR REEVE
- 7 CABINET OFFICE
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- 9 ADDITIONAL
- 10 SOUTHERN AFRICA
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Catchword:

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1986

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister
Agree this message,
with the amendments
I have suggested? CB

South Africa: Follow up to the European Council

/ I now attach a draft message for the
Prime Minister to send to General Obasanjo
and Mr Malcolm Fraser.


7/7

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1 ZCZC		
TC	2 CONFIDENTIAL		
CAVEAT	3		
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AND TO	8 AND TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA		
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	11 EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES		
	12 1. Following is text of a message from the Prime Minister to		
	13 General Obasanjo and Mr Fraser. Please arrange to have it		
	14 delivered as soon as possible.		
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	16 Following last week's meeting of the European Council I should		
	17 like to let you know how we see the next steps in relation to		
	18 South Africa.		
	19		
	20 You will know from our meeting on 12 June, when you kindly		
	21 called on me to discuss the COMGEP report, that like all my		
	22 colleagues in the Commonwealth, I was ^{greatly} grievously disappointed by		
	23 the breakdown of your mission. As I said then, it is tragic		
	24 that having achieved so much you should at the last have found it		
	25 impossible to reach a successful conclusion.		
///	26		
//	27 Since we met we have, of course, all been considering what more		
/	28 is needed to bring about a change in the attitude of the South		
	29 African Government. So too have my colleagues at the Heads of		
//			
YYYY		Catchword: European	
MAIN	File number	Dept Private Office	Drafted by (Block capitals) C R Budd
ADDITIONAL			Telephone no 4831
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*in establishing
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that
route
is still
possible*

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
European Governments. Like us in the Commonwealth they believe, with the same profound conviction, that the objectives which the Commonwealth set at Nassau - to bring apartheid to an end, through dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides - remain entirely valid. After all, those were the objectives which the Community too set itself at Luxembourg last September, and again at the joint meeting with the Front Line States in Lusaka earlier this year.

The question we all asked each other once again at The Hague was this: ~~is the promotion of dialogue now a quite hopeless case, or is there still a case for trying once more the road of persuasion before we resign ourselves to the prospect of South Africa being caught up inevitably in a rising tide of violence~~ *is not the prospect of a rising tide of violence in South Africa so serious, that we should make a further attempt to promote dialogue, building on the work which your Group had done?*

Let me stress with all the sincerity at my command that I have been profoundly concerned - as I know you have been - at recent developments in South Africa. The reimposition of the State of Emergency and the further internal measures going with it are a recipe for an even swifter upward spiral of repression and violence and inter-racial conflict than the one we so recently discussed. I am ~~utterly~~ determined that everything possible should be done to avert that looming catastrophe, and to bring apartheid to an end by peaceful means, through negotiation and not conflict.

~~we need to establish whether~~

The question is whether that route is still possible. A crucial factor must be the attitude of the South African Government. My reading of the Afrikaner character is quite clear: if we are to avoid simply driving President Botha and his people inside the laager, then it is imperative that we should demonstrate our disapproval and condemnation of the policies of the South African




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	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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<<<<
 You will recall at the end of our meeting you suggested that I might myself meet President Botswana.

1 <<<<
 2 Government without causing them to react in such a way as to
 3 rule out dialogue and compromise.
 4
 5 It was with those thoughts in mind that I approached my meeting
 6 in The Hague with my European Community colleagues. After long
 7 discussion we reached agreement on the most effective action that
 8 we could take at this stage.
 9
 10 We had no doubt that the key move that was necessary to promote
 11 the genuine national dialogue which we all want was for the
 12 South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson
 13 Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on the
 14 ANC, PAC and other political parties. You will recall my own
 15 strong feeling about the need to focus on these steps. Open
 16 square bracket For Obasanjo only: And I recall your saying to me
 17 on 12 June that the release of Nelson Mandela could open the way
 18 to a solution. close square bracket. Despite the obvious
 19 difficulties involved we decided too that it was right to
 20 undertake ^{a European} ~~one more~~ diplomatic initiative to that end. It was
 21 accordingly agreed that Geoffrey Howe should go to Southern
 22 Africa, in his capacity as President of the European Council of
 23 Ministers and with the full support of the Community, to carry out
 24 this mission. ~~(He is proposing to make a first visit as soon as~~
 25 ~~possible.)~~
 26
 27 It was also agreed that during the next three months in support
 28 of that mission the Twelve would enter into consultations with the
 29 other industrialised countries on further measures which might be
 30 needed, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the
 31 import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa.
 32 This decision to consult other industrialised countries about
 33 possible contingency measures was, of course, intended to
 34 reinforce the position we in the Commonwealth have already taken:



For distribution order see Page Catchword: if

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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Caveat

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IMMEDIATE

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2 if measures are to be effective it is essential that they should
3 have the support of the industrialised countries as a whole.

4 Open square bracket For Fraser only: We also had in mind your
5 ^{argument} agreement that the possibility of further measures is needed in
6 order to give moderate blacks in South Africa some hope of Western
7 support. close square bracket.

9 I can well understand that you and your fellow members of the
10 Eminent Persons Group must be concerned that this move by the
11 Community might cut across the work on which we have been
12 engaged together. I should like to give you ~~an~~ very strong
13 assurance that the action we have taken with our European
14 partners is very much in keeping with the spirit of what the
15 Commonwealth agreed in Nassau. The mission being undertaken by
16 Geoffrey Howe is ~~in no way~~ intended to supersede or undermine the
17 findings of the Eminent Persons Group. Its aim, on the contrary,
18 is to build on your work and follow the course which you charted,
19 in pursuit of the same objectives. The seven Commonwealth heads of
20 Government will have an opportunity to discuss all these issues
21 at the meeting in London in August to review the Commonwealth
22 Accord. Meanwhile I should like to assure you that ^{see} Geoffrey Howe's
23 mission is most seriously and sincerely intended. If it is to
24 have a chance of success against what we must all see as very long
25 odds, he will need to have the chance of meeting a wide range of
26 people in Southern Africa, as well as members of the South African
27 Government. I do very much hope that you will feel able to lend
28 such support and encouragement as you can.

29 ^{in appropriate, at an appropriate level. But it was with your}
30 Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: Finally, I should like once
31 more to add my own personal tribute to the part you played in the
32 COMGEP mission. The integrity ~~ematurity~~ and statesmanship which
33 you contributed in such full measure throughout reaped praise not
34 only for yourself but for your country and the Commonwealth as a

[I would omit this. It is not agreed.]

[You will recall that at the end of our meeting you suggested that I might myself visit Brno. I did not think this would be appropriate.]

[Makes him sound juvenile!]

The moderate, middle class whites who 'closed' South Africa

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Catchword: whole

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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IMMEDIATE

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1 <<<<

2 whole. I thank you most warmly. close square bracket

3 Ends

5 HOWE

8 YYYY

9 MAIN

10 SOUTHERN AFRICA

11 STANDARD (PALACE)

12 SAFD

13 OADS

14 CCD

15 NAD

16 ECDS

17 SPD

18 MR REEVE

19 CABINET OFFICE

21 ADDITIONAL

22 SOUTHERN AFRICA

24 NNNN

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Catchword: