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SOUTH AFRICA: Relations: A13

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T158/86**

Message Begins

"We send this joint message to you following the outcome of the Commonwealth Review Meeting held recently in London when the Heads of Government of Australia, Britain, Canada, The Bahamas, India, Zambia and Zimbabwe met in pursuance of our earlier "Accord on Southern Africa" adopted by the meeting of 46 Commonwealth leaders at Nassau last October. The conclusions of our London meeting are set out in the 17 paragraphs of the Communique issued at its conclusion. A copy of that Communique accompanies this message.

The first point we wish to emphasise is that of those 17 paragraphs, 15 were unanimous. In them, all seven of us expressed a collective judgement and resolve in relation to the situation in Southern Africa as follows:

- we all reaffirmed our united belief that apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end;

- we all commended the work of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), whose Report, "Mission to South Africa", we recognised had commanded attention world-wide "as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa". We particularly commended the Group's 'Negotiating Concept' and deeply regretted its rejection by the South African Government;

- we all judged it to be clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security;
- in responding to the EPG's challenge that "the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral but must take concerted action", we all agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa;
- we all acknowledged that if Pretoria were to respond positively to the call we originally made in the Nassau Accord for specific action in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency, we stood ready to review the situation and, if appropriate, rescind the measures we have adopted;
- correspondingly we all confirmed that if in a reasonable time even the further measures agreed at London did not have the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered.

As to the nature of further measures to be adopted at this stage, the six of us from Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, India, Zambia and Zimbabwe thought that the list in paragraph 11 of the London Communique should be adopted. For her part, the British Prime Minister favoured the three items in paragraph 12.

Developments within South Africa during the last few weeks confirm that the programme which the six of us agreed in London is appropriate and necessary. If there were any lingering doubts about the intentions of the South African Government, none can remain after State President Botha's policy statements to his National Party Congress in Durban. In this, as in many other respects, the findings of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were remarkably prescient. In its Report, the Group concluded that "at present

there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid" and "no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government". President Botha has bluntly confirmed the correctness of these conclusions. Any hope that the Party Congress would be used to obtain a mandate for fundamental change in the direction demanded by the entire international community is now at an end. Indeed the pronouncements and actions of the South African Government since our Review Meeting have exacerbated the situation further. The prospect ahead is one of increasing calamitous violence - a prospect starkly reinforced by conditions prevailing in South Africa under the present emergency.

Yours is a country where the equality of all members of society is enshrined in law, and where freedom and justice are living constitutional realities. We know that you share our detestation of apartheid and our belief that its elimination is ultimately inevitable. The question is, however, in what time-scale, and by what means? We believe that the answer to both questions can be influenced by the attitude of the international community and by concerted international action. We ourselves have been confirmed in this belief by the clear view of the Eminent Persons Group (and that of other serious reports on the South African situation) that apartheid's end will be the product of a combination of internal and external pressures.

In deciding on the actual measures we should adopt, the six of us were particularly mindful of the link between internal and external pressure for change. In our view, effective external pressure is necessary to encourage South Africa to pursue the path of negotiation, dialogue and peaceful change without which the situation would inevitably escalate into a protracted and bloody internal struggle. The imperatives of effective and concerted international action could not, we feel, be greater. These grounds, among others, lead us to seek your support and that of South Africa's other major trading partners, in conjunction with the wider international community, for imposing in a co-ordinated way a programme of substantial economic measures against South Africa. We ourselves agreed in London to eleven measures by way of economic sanctions against South Africa and we commend them to you for your urgent consideration:

- (a) a ban on air links with South Africa;
- (b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa;
- (c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;
- (d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;
- (e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa;
- (f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;
- (g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies;
- (h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa;
- (i) a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors;
- (j) a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa; and
- (k) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.

We see such a programme as not to punish but to impress on the authorities in Pretoria and their supporters in South Africa that apartheid must be dismantled and a future built for all the people of South Africa that is truly non-racial and democratic within a united and non-fragmented

country. It is our earnest hope that you will act and that your action will be consistent with the measures that are being adopted in the Commonwealth. Our appeal to you is shared by the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth Governments and their peoples.

With a view to getting this message urgently to you, we are asking the Commonwealth Secretary-General to transmit it on our joint behalf through your Ambassador in London.

Robert Hawke
Prime Minister of Australia

Lynden Pindling
Prime Minister of The Bahamas

Brian Mulroney
Prime Minister of Canada

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India

Kenneth D. Kaunda
President of Zambia

Robert Mugabe
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe"

Message Ends



AG2BJG

cc: Fco

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 September 1986

In the Prime Minister's absence in Scotland, I am writing to thank you for your letter of 27 August enclosing a copy of the joint message from six Commonwealth Heads of Government to President Reagan, European Community Heads of Government and Prime Minister Nakasone.

As you will be aware, the member states of the European Community will be considering South Africa again later this month, within the context of The Hague Communique of 27 June. The British approach is well known to you and remains as set out in the Communique issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Review Meeting.

Charles Powell

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal AC, Kt, CMG, QC.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 September 1986

Dear Charles,

Measures against South Africa:
Messages to the Prime Minister from the Commonwealth
Secretary General and the Australian High Commissioner

The Prime Minister has received letters from Sonny Ramphal²⁷⁻⁸⁻⁸⁶ and the Australian High Commissioner about international measures against South Africa. ²⁰⁻⁸⁻⁸⁶

The first covers the text of a message from the other six Commonwealth Heads of Government who attended the Marlborough House Commonwealth Review Meeting (CRM) addressed to President Reagan, other EC Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of Japan. The second covers the text of a message from Mr Hawke to other EC Heads of Government.

The two messages urge (in very similar terms) the adoption of economic measures against South Africa consistent with those agreed upon by the other six participating countries at the CRM, but not by the UK. In both cases these texts are sent to the Prime Minister for information in her capacity as President of the European Council.

It is irksome but not unexpected that Commonwealth leaders should have chosen to lobby for measures unacceptable to HMG in advance of the round of discussions on South Africa which will taken place in the EC during September: they base their action on the call for wider consultations within the international community in paragraph 11 (ii) (d) of the CRM communique. Both messages, while expressing views with which we do not agree, are moderate in tone and take accurate account of the UK position.

In the Foreign Secretary's view, there is little to be gained from entering into a further substantive exchange in the context of this correspondence. The Prime Minister made her views very clear at the CRM: and other Commonwealth Heads of Government can be in no doubt about them. Sir Geoffrey Howe therefore recommends that Messrs Ramphal and Parsons should be sent little more than a bland acknowledgement, drafts of which I enclose herewith.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: Prime Minister *CDP*

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

Mr Shridath Ramphal

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

In re Die Another: document is sorted, I am writing no

PRIVACY MARKING

Thank you for your letter of 24 August enclosing a copy of the joint message of our six colleagues at the Commonwealth Review Meeting to President Reagan, my European Community Colleagues and Prime Minister Nakasone.

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

As you will be aware, the member states of the European Community will be considering *South Africa case* later this month their response to the crisis in South Africa and the best means of demonstrating our disapproval of apartheid. These discussions will be taking place within the context of the Hague Communique of 27 June. *The is well known to you and remains as set out* The British approach is set out clearly in the Communique issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Review Meeting.

D

CDP
[Signature]

Enclosures flag(s)

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
PS/NO 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

A R Parsons
Australian High Commissioner

*052
BJH*

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 August enclosing Mr Hawke's message to her European Community colleagues on South Africa.

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

Mrs Thatcher has read the message with care. As *Mr Hawke's message*
 Mr Hawke knows, the Twelve will be considering later
~~this month, how best to give expression to our abhorrence~~
~~of apartheid and advance the cause of internal reform~~
~~in South Africa. Our discussions will take place in~~
 the context of the Hague Communiqué of 27 June. The
 British approach ^{*remains as*} ~~is~~ set out ~~clearly~~ in paragraph 12
 of the Communiqué issued at the end of the Commonwealth
 Review Meeting.

GM

Enclosures flag(s)

S. AFRICA: Relations: A13





Booklet sent to Fco -
to be returned.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

28 August 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Commonwealth Secretary General which in turn forwards a message about South Africa sent by the other six Heads of Government who attended the Commonwealth Review Meeting in London earlier in August to President Reagan, Mr. Nakasone and the European Community Heads of Government.

I should be grateful for advice on whether any reply is considered necessary, either on the substance of the message or on the procedure chosen by the six Heads of Government, emphasizing as it does that they are proceeding separately from the United Kingdom.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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27 August 1986

Mr Sean, Finis Kinnick.

I have been asked by your six colleagues who attended the Review Meeting in London earlier this month to transmit to you for your information, both as a participant in the Meeting and in your capacity as President of the European Council, a copy of a joint message which they have addressed to President Reagan, to your colleague Heads of Government of the European Community, and to Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan.

W. S. ...
Shridath S. Ramphal

Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of Great Britain
& Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London SW1

**Commonwealth
Heads of
Government
Review Meeting**

**Communiqué
London August 1986**



Commonwealth Secretariat

Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting

Communiqué
London August 1986



Financial Times

Standing, l to r: Rajiv Gandhi (India), Brian Mulroney (Canada), Shridath Ramphal (Secretary-General), Robert Hawke (Australia), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). Seated, Margaret Thatcher (Britain), Sir Lynden Pindling (Bahamas), Dr Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia)

**Commonwealth Heads of Government
Review Meeting, London 3-5 August 1986
Communiqué**

1. As agreed at Nassau last October, our Meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa* which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".

2. At our request the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr Malcolm Fraser, introduced the report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.

3. The Report of the EPG, Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions. That unanimous Report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa. We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's 'negotiating concept' and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.

* Appended at page 9 to this Communiqué

4. At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

5. As envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed; the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid" and "no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government". We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

6. We receive the Group's findings with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work, terminated its efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.

7. It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

8. Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We

acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

9. We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

10. In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in para 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we have looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures, we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.

11. The British Government's position is set out in paragraph 12. The rest of us have agreed as follows:

- (a) The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.
- (b) We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation:
 - (i) All the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
 - (a) a ban on air links with South Africa,
 - (b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,
 - (c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,
 - (d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,

- (e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,
- (f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa,
- (g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and
- (h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and

(ii) the following additional measures:

- (i) a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,
- (j) a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and
- (k) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.

(c) while expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned in paragraph 12 below.

(d) We feel, however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

12. The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:

- (i) put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa,
- (ii) put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- (iii) accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

13. As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

14. We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate; and to contribute, in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

15. On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.

16. Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government Meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its

capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

17. Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

5 August 1986

HEADS OF DELEGATIONS

Australia	The Rt Hon Robert Hawke, Prime Minister
The Bahamas	The Rt Hon Sir Lynden Pindling, Prime Minister
Britain	The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Canada	The Rt Hon Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
India	The Hon Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister
Zambia	H E Dr Kenneth Kaunda, President
Zimbabwe	The Hon Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister

Commonwealth Secretariat H E Mr Shridath Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General

The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa

1. We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. At New Delhi we expressed the view that "only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa." We are united in the belief that reliance on the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years. The growing crisis and intensified repression in South Africa mean that apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end. We consider that the situation calls for urgent practical steps.

2. We, therefore, call on the authorities in Pretoria for the following steps to be taken in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency:

- (a) Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.
- (b) Terminate the existing state of emergency.
- (c) Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.
- (d) Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.
- (e) Initiate, in the context of a suspension of

violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

3. We have agreed on a number of measures which have as their rationale impressing on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa. The latter, in particular, demands a process of dialogue involving the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa. We believe that we must do all we can to assist that process, while recognising that the forms of political settlement in South Africa are for the people of that country - all the people - to determine.

4. To this end, we have decided to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue. We are not unmindful of the difficulties such an effort will encounter, including the possibility of initial rejection by the South African authorities, but we believe it to be our duty to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change in South Africa and avoid the dreadful prospect of violent conflict that looms over South Africa, threatening people of all races in the country, and the peace and stability of the entire Southern Africa region.

5. We are asking the President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe to develop with the Secretary-General the modalities of this effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. We would look to the group of eminent persons to seek to facilitate the processes of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2(e) above and by all practicable means to advance the fulfilment of the objectives of this Accord.

6. For our part, we have as an earnest of our opposition to apartheid, reached accord on a programme of common action as follows:

- (i) We declare the Commonwealth's support for the strictest enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558, and commit ourselves to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law.

- (ii) We reaffirm the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977, which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa.

- (iii) We agree upon, and commend to other governments, the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa, which have already been adopted by a number of member countries:

- (a) a ban on all new government loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies;
- (b) a readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands;
- (c) no Government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa;
- (d) a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces;
- (e) a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa;
- (f) a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;
- (g) a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment from South Africa;
- (h) an embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa; and
- (i) discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.

7. It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objectives stated above in six months. The Heads of

Government mentioned in paragraph 5 above, or their representatives, will then meet to review the situation. If in their opinion adequate progress has not been made within this period, we agree to consider the adoption of further measures. Some of us would, in that event, consider the following steps among others:

- (a) a ban on air links with South Africa;
- (b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa;
- (c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;
- (d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;
- (e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa;
- (f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;
- (g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies;
- (h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

8. Finally, we agree that should all of the above measures fail to produce the desired results within a reasonable period, further effective measures will have to be considered. Many of us have either taken or are prepared to take measures which go beyond those listed above, and each of us will pursue the objectives of this Accord in all the ways and through all appropriate fora open to us. We believe, however, that in pursuing this programme jointly, we enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern Africa region as a whole.

Lyford Cay, Nassau
20 October 1985



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